

MARY FERRELL FOUNDATION

preserving the legacy

www.maryferrell.org



Title: TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS, 31 JUL 1975

Author: n/a

Pages: 180

Agency: SSCIA

RIF#: 157-10002-10165

Subjects: CIA; CUBA; CASTRO; LANSKY, MEYER; BAY OF PIGS; ASSASSINATION; TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS; RUBY, JACK; CHILE; ALLENDE; OPERATION MONGOOSE

Source: AARC

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-696

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

DATE : 07/31/75
PAGES : 178

SUBJECTS :

CIA
CUBA
CASTRO
LANSKY, MEYER
BAY OF PIGS
ASSASSINATION
TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS
RUBY, JACK
CHILE
ALLENDE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/25/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 256
Folder 14
Exhibits under separate record

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
Courtesy THEARC

~~TOP SECRET~~

Vol. 3 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

The United States Senate

R 696

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
ON 5/25/77
BY EJS

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

J. 1 MAR 94
(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Refer to CIA
2/23/94 *MM*

Thursday, July 31, 1975

Washington, D.C.

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
Approves Release of this Document
Date 5/5/94 *J.H.*

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

A

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

CONTENTSTESTIMONY OF

David Atlee Phillips

PAGE

2

Afternoon Session -- p. 96

EXHIBITSNUMBER

Phillips Exhibit No. 1

22

Phillips Exhibit No. 2

94

Phillips Exhibit No. 3

105

Phillips Exhibit No. 4

106

Phillips Exhibit No. 5

111

Phillips Exhibit No. 6

113

Phillips Exhibit No. 7

117

Phillips Exhibit No. 8

130

Phillips Exhibit No. 9

136

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

2

1 The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

2 Mr. Phillips, will you please stand and take the oath?

3 Do you swear that everything you will testify to in
4 this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
5 but the truth, so help you God?

6 Mr. Phillips. I do.

7 TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

8 Mr. Schwarz. Will you give your full name and address,
9 please?

10 Mr. Phillips. David Atlee Phillips, 8224 Stone Trail
11 Drive, Bethesda, Maryland.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And your current employment is in some
13 way representative of CIA retired officers, is that right?

14 Mr. Phillips. I have formed an organization of retired
15 intelligence officers from all services. There is no official
16 connection with CIA or any other service.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And your job is to go out and speak in the
18 public in the interest of the intelligence services, is that
19 right?

20 Mr. Phillips. To attempt to explain intelligence in
21 American society, and to arrange for other people to speak,
22 and that sort of thing. I do a considerable amount myself.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Are you still doing that?

24 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Are you paid in any way by the CIA still?

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

3

1 Mr. Phillips. I am not. I have no official connection.
2 And I didn't seek any approval or endorsement.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Have you talked with anybody in the CIA
4 since you left it about your activities?

5 Mr. Phillips. I have talked to a good number of people
6 who come to my house, because they are ex-CIA people. I
7 have seen some people who worked in CIA in social situations.

8 Mr. Schwarz. What is the highest official at the
9 CIA with whom you have talked about your activities since you
10 left the CIA?

11 Mr. Phillips. No senior officials.

12 Mr. Schwarz. When did you join the CIA?

13 Mr. Phillips. I first became a contract agent of the
14 CIA in 1950.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Prior to that you had been an actor?

16 Mr. Phillips. I had been an actor in New York for some
17 years. Then I went to Chile in 1948 and went into the
18 newspaper business.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And how did you join up with the CIA?

20 Mr. Phillips. The newspaper that I had purchased
21 was printed at another newspaper plant. I decided the only
22 way I could make money was through job printing. So I
23 purchased a printing plant.

24 The day that I purchased it the CIA station chief called
25 me and invited me for lunch. The idea was that since I was

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

4

1 a clearable American and I had a printing press, in those days,
2 1950, that was sort of irresistible.

3 Mr. Schwarz. How long did you work covertly for the
4 CIA as a member -- to the outside world in fact it appeared
5 that you were running a printing press?

6 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

7 Mr. Schwarz. That was publishing what kind of things?

8 Mr. Phillips. An English language weekly called the
9 South Pacific Mail.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And how long did you appear to do that
11 when you were in fact being paid by the CIA?

12 Mr. Phillips. From the time the CIA first picked me
13 up in 1950 until I left Chile in March of 1954.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Did you then become a contract employee
15 at the CIA or an actual employee of the CIA?

16 Mr. Phillips. I was a contract employee.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever become an actual employee
18 of the CIA.

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I did, I became a staff officer in,
20 I believe it was 1955.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do while you were a contract
22 officer before you became a staff officer?

23 Mr. Phillips. Well, during the years in Chile I assisted
24 the CIA Station. My first pay was \$50 a month. So my income
25 was not all from the CIA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

5

1 Then in 1954 I was asked if I would leave rather abruptly
2 to go to Guatemala. And I went to Guatemala -- I actually
3 went to Florida and later to Central America on the Guatemala
4 operation in 1954.

5 Mr. Schwarz. That was the coup that deposed Mr.
6 Arbenz?

7 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

8 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do in that connection?

9 Mr. Phillips. I was in charge of a clandestine radio
10 team.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And were you then purportedly an independent
12 member of the media, or admittedly an agent of the CIA?

13 Mr. Phillips. No, I was not admittedly an agent of the
14 CIA.

15 Mr. Schwarz. What would the outside world think you
16 were at that point?

17 Mr. Phillips. Before I left Chile I contracted to go on
18 a two-year lecture tour in the U.S. talking about Latin America.
19 My gimmick was the boy editor. I had that contract, and so
20 I explained to people that I was waiting for that to begin,
21 which indeed was the case.

22 Mr. Schwarz. And were you paid by the CIA when you were
23 going around giving those lectures?

24 Mr. Phillips. I was not. They asked me to become a
25 staff officer, but there was no legal way that I could keep

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
FOR THE AMERICAN
PEOPLES

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

6

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 the money for the lectures for which I had contracted for a
2 couple of years. So, they gave me a contract which was called
3 a covert associate, which meant that they paid me for the
4 times I worked for them, but when I went off to give a lec-
5 ture date it was on leave without pay status.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Before you get into substantive questions
7 about your role with the CIA, let me go over with you some
8 procedural matters which I imagine the staff has already done.

9 Do you know you have a right to counsel?

10 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I do.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And if you want to stop and obtain counsel
12 you can do that at any time?

13 Mr. Phillips. Very well.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And you have got your constitutional rights?

15 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. While you were in Guatemala did you appear
17 to the outside world to be in the media?

18 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, I
19 tried to stay away from the outside world. I lived most
20 of the time in Central America, and not in Guatemala, sort of
21 out in the jungle.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Between Guatemala and your connection
23 with Cuba in the early 1960's what did you do?

24 Mr. Phillips. I came back to Washington. And I was on
25 the staff that had to do with radio and television.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

7

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. What do you do in connection with Cuba?

2 Mr. Phillips. I went to Cuba as a non-official officer
3 in 1955. I was there until 1956. I was engaged in sort of
4 propaganda activities trying to put the proper U.S. image
5 in the papers, and that sort of thing.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Did you go back to Cuba after that?

7 Mr. Phillips. Yes. I was asked to leave Cuba and
8 to go to Lebanon in 1957.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And that was another crisis, then, at
10 that time?

11 Mr. Phillips. No, in 1957 it wasn't a crisis. So, I
12 went in 1957. I left in 1958, and then returned again to
13 Cuba. This time I had resigned from the Agency. I came through
14 Washington and resigned from the Agency, because I had seen
15 Cuba under Batista, and it had occurred to me that it was
16 obvious that Fidel Castro, to me at least, was going to win.
17 The American companies there didn't practice public relations
18 with one or two exceptions, or labor relations. And I said,
19 what I will do is go back in and set up a public relations firm
20 and wait until Castro wins, and then I will have a lot of
21 business. So I resigned from the Agency.

22 But on my resignation in Washington they asked me to
23 accept a contract for five or seven hundred dollars a month
24 to work part time. So, I was not a staff officer at that time,
25 I went to Cuba as a contract officer again.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

8

1 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the companies with whom you
2 were working in Cuba that you were also employed by the
3 CIA?

4 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

5 Mr. Schwarz. When you were in Cuba did you come in con-
6 tact with a man called Meyer Lansky?

7 Mr. Phillips. I have seen Meyer Lansky in the gambling
8 casinos, I think in the Hotel Nationale. I have never talked
9 to him or met him.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know whether the CIA utilized his
11 services in order to acquire intelligence concerning Cuba?

12 Mr. Phillips. If they did I never knew of it.

13 Mr. Schwarz. When did you rejoin the CIA?

14 Mr. Phillips. The plans that I had for a public re-
15 lations firm turned out to be very correct in the sense that
16 I had the fastest growing one in the world for a few months,
17 and then the public relations evaporated in Cuba.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Evaporated when Castro took over?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes. So, I found myself working almost
20 full time for the CIA again. And I returned to the U.S. as
21 a part of the planning and operating unit for the Bay of Pigs.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything about efforts to
23 assassinate Fidel Castro?

24 Mr. Phillips. I never heard of any, until recently.

25 Even when Howard Hunt returned from Cuba, in his book he said

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

9

1 he came back with plans for assassination of Castro. I saw
2 Howard Hunt quite a lot there. He never mentioned them to me,
3 and I never knew of such plans.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know William O'Connell?

5 Mr. Phillips. I do not.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know William Harvey?

7 Mr. Phillips. I have heard of him, but I never met
8 him.

9 When I say I have never met him, I might very well have
10 been in meetings with either one of these gentlemen, but I don't
11 remember ever talking or meeting with either one of them.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Apart from the knowledge of assassina-
13 tions, what do you know about the provision of Weapons to
14 persons who might go to Cuba in opposition to the Castro
15 regime?

16 Mr. Phillips. Well, of course, that ran the entire
17 spectrum from the Bay of Pigs brigade, given weapons, includ-
18 ing tanks, down to infiltration teams. I think all of them
19 carried arms and that sort of thing.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know a lot about the infiltration
21 teams? Were you involved with them?

22 Mr. Phillips. Not a great deal. Because my concern was
23 radio propaganda.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Santos Trafficante in
25 connection with your work?

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

10

1 Mr. Phillips. I did not.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

3 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know him under the name of Ruben-
5 stein?

6 Mr. Phillips. I did not.

7 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba
8 and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your
9 time on?

10 Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to
11 Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very
12 early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican
13 Republic [REDACTED]

14 Mr. Schwarz. And then --

15 Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until
16 the summer of 1967.

17 ... And after that I returned to Washington and became
18 the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

19 In 1970 I went to Rio de Janeiro [REDACTED] And
20 in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to
21 Brasilia from Rio de Janeiro.

22 In 1972 I went to Venezuela [REDACTED]

23 And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of
24 the then Western Hemisphere Division.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

11

1 you resigned?

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes, until last May.

3 Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear about your assign-
4 ment to work on Chile in the fall of 1970?

5 Mr. Phillips. A cable came to Rio de Janeiro about
6 the 16th, more or less --

7 Mr. Schwarz. From --

8 Mr. Phillips. From Washington -- asking me if I would
9 return to Washington for a special assignment. It didn't say
10 what the assignment was.

11 I arrived here, I believe it was the 18th, 17th, 19th,
12 something like that, but I came up within a day or so to
13 Washington.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And you were told to head a task force?

15 Mr. Phillips. I was.

16 Mr. Schwarz. What was the objective of the task force?

17 Mr. Phillips. I was told that the decision had been
18 made by the President that he wanted to see what could be
19 done to keep Salvador Allende from assuming the presidency.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Who told you that?

21 Mr. Phillips. I think that probably must have been
22 Bill Broe, who was the Division Chief, and consequently
23 my boss.

24 Mr. Schwarz. But then you and he operated sort of in
25 tandem on the task force, is that right?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

12

1 Mr. Phillips. Yes, we did. I was the one that sat in
2 the room where the task force was and saw that the cables
3 went out, and so forth. But he was still the Chief of the
4 Division.

5 Mr. Schwarz. When you were told the President wanted to
6 see what could be done to keep Allende from assuming power,
7 were any limitations placed upon the tactics which you were to
8 explore?

9 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that there were any.
10 They were said to explore all avenues and all options and see
11 if there is anything that can be done to keep him from assuming
12 office.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Did you believe that you were free to do
14 whatever would accomplish that objective?

15 Mr. Phillips. Not at all.

16 Mr. Schwarz. What did you believe limited your freedom
17 then?

18 Mr. Phillips. Well, to get right down to it, I suppose
19 the basis issue is, I never heard that these options included
20 assassination, for instance, no one ever discussed it, nor
21 was it ever suggested in this case. Otherwise we would look
22 for everything we could.

23 Mr. Schwarz. In your professional judgment do you ex-
24 clude from a permissible option assassination when you are
25 given an instruction to take steps in order to prevent a certain

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

13

1 person from taking office?

2 Mr. Phillips. I do. And if anyone had ever told
3 me that, I would have told them to go to hell.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Why?

5 Mr. Phillips. Because I believe it is absolutely wrong.
6 And my moral, ethical situation would be too disturbed. I
7 would never think about it.

8 Mr. Schwarz. So under no circumstances would you take
9 a general order like, get rid of Allende, as meaning you
10 were entitled to take steps to assassinate him?

11 Mr. Phillips. Absolutely not.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And you believe that that would be
13 contrary to the operating principles under which the
14 Agency has operated through the years that you knew it, is
15 that right?

16 Mr. Phillips. All of the principles that I knew of
17 over these years, absolutely.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know Mr. Helms?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I do.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Do you believe that he would share the
21 same attitude that you expressed?

22 Mr. Phillips. I will have to let Mr. Helms answer that,
23 because I really would be voicing an opinion for him, and I
24 can't do that.

25 Mr. Schwarz. He has never said anything to you one way

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

14

1 or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as
2 to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or
3 the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be
4 necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually
5 assassinate some one.

6 Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even
7 get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an
8 option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency
10 talk that way?

11 Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard
12 human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that
13 saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were
14 bumped off or something.

15 But I have never heard two officers sit down and
16 seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever
17 said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line
18 and say almost anything.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with
20 the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specific-
21 cally a Major Marshall, [REDACTED] that they intended
22 to assassinate Allende?

23 Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall,
24 Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think
25 of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

15

1 high-powered rifle. But as I recall it, that is one
2 of all sorts of things he talked about. He was sort of a
3 wild hand.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Having heard that suggestion from
5 that man, did you take any steps thereafter to prohibit or
6 bar assassination? And if not, why not?

7 Mr. Phillips. No, I did not specifically take any
8 such steps, because during that period I am not aware of a single
9 time when we really thought someone was seriously planning
10 an assassination. I think I may have played a role. You will
11 understand that in this task force I was not a policy maker.
12 I was coming up to run the shop. But I do think that unquestionably
13 I played a role, because I had had a number of
14 years of experience in Chile.

15 And so only in the most oblique and general way -- in the
16 case of General Marshall I believe that my opinion that he
17 was a wild man and we should not have anything to do with him
18 might have been a deciding factor in turning him off. In a
19 slightly more specific sense, I believe that my strong recom-
20 mendation, reiterated on several occasions, that General
21 Viaux' chances for success in whatever he was doing were no
22 good were probably responsible for the final decision to tell
23 General Viaux to sort of knock it off.

24 When I arrived there I tried to think of the chances
25 of success of this operation. I objected to it for two reasons.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

16

1 One is personal, and really not germane to what you are asking.
2 The other is professional.

3 Mr. Schwarz. When you say this operation, what are you
4 referring to?

5 Mr. Phillips. I am talking about the six and a half
6 weeks in 1970 in Chile.

7 Mr. Schwarz. The whole thing, not any part?

8 Mr. Phillips. The whole thing.

9 The first one was a personal opinion about the operation
10 which is not germane.

11 And the other is professional, and it is my feeling
12 that the odds are unacceptable, it is something that is not
13 going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into
14 it.

15 So, I tried to establish a criteria of recommendation to
16 the people that I dealt with which was based on a scale of 20:
17 what are the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or
18 in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?

19 And so he quoted figures in a range of up to 20, and we
20 never even got to two chances out of 20. Usually it was about
21 one and a half to one.

22 And in the middle of October I told them they were
23 so low as far as General Viaux was concerned -- and I believe
24 that figure was actually quoted in a document -- that the
25 chances were one percent or one-half of one percent. But

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

17

1 professionally the risk factor was too high, just as the
2 proposal to bribe Chilean congressmen.

3 Mr. Schwarz. That wasn't just a proposal, that was
4 actually done.

5 Mr. Phillips. That was money approved. But I suppose
6 that people that did that must have worked in Honduras or some-
7 thing. But anyone that had lived in Chile as I had and knew
8 Chileans knew that you might get away with bribing one
9 Chilean Senator, but two, never, and three, not a chance.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Because it would become public, you
11 mean?

12 Mr. Phillips. They would blow the whistle. They were
13 democrats and had been for a long time.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Let me put together two points you testi-
15 fied to and maybe you can give us a large explanation. You
16 said sometime ago that you were not the policy maker.

17 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And you said in your most recent answer
19 that your professional judgment was that the chances of the
20 operation succeeding were very slim.

21 Mr. Phillips. Minus scale.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Minus scale. And at best two out of 20.

23 Mr. Phillips. It never approached two out of 20.

24 Mr. Schwarz. In other words, as you know, a good deal
25 was done.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

18

1 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now, who were the policy makers? Where
3 was the pressure coming from to act in the face of your
4 professional judgment that it would not work, and indeed that
5 it would counter productive, which I take it was also your
6 impression?

7 Mr. Phillips. I didn't make my feeling terribly
8 strong on that. I limited myself to saying, this is a bad
9 idea, it is not going to work.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Given your professional judgment that it
11 wouldn't work, and the chances were minuscule, and given the
12 fact that a lot was done, the nature of which we are all going
13 to come to, where was the pressure coming from to act despite
14 your professional judgment? That is the first question.

15 And the second, who were the policy makers which you
16 say you were not?

17 Mr. Phillips. The line of command was from me and
18 the task force to the division, Mr. Broe. All of Mr. Broe's
19 staff was not aware of this. I think perhaps his deputy
20 and one or two others. Mr. Broe in my personal opinion didn't
21 think very highly of the operation, either.

22 It then went directly to the Deputy Director of Plans
23 at that time, Mr. Thomas Karamessines. In essence Mr.
24 Karamessines was more of a "case officer" in this instance
25 than he usually is.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

19

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATIONAL
COMMITTEE

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. More intimately involved?

2 Mr. Phillips. Exactly.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And he was in fact intimately involved?

4 Mr. Phillips. In fact on a day by day basis.

5 My understanding at the time was that Mr. Karamessines

6 was reacting from clearly stated and fairly constant

7 pressure from the White House.

8 Mr. Schwarz. And your understanding was that that

9 pressure came from whom at the White House?

10 Mr. Phillips. I cannot speak authoritatively on that.

11 Mr. Schwarz. I know you can't, but what were you told

12 and what was your understanding?

13 Mr. Phillips. I understood that the message was being

14 delivered through National Security Council Chief Kissinger at

15 the time, and that they represented the viewpoints of President

16 Nixon. I cannot speak authoritatively on that, but that was

17 my impression.

18 Mr. Schwarz. That is what you were told, and you can't

19 go beyond it?

20 Mr. Phillips. They didn't take me along to the White

21 House, and that sort of thing.

22 Mr. Schwarz. You met with Karamessines constantly?

23 Mr. Phillips. Constantly.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with Helms?

25 Mr. Phillips. I met with him, but very infrequently.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

20

1 I think when I first came back from Chile, and perhaps once
2 or twice during that period, and a final meeting after General
3 Schneider was shot at a meeting when we were talking about
4 what was going to happen, and that was the time when I said
5 that I thought the odds were now one-tenth of one percent.

6 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to try and remember to come
7 back to that final meeting. You have got a good memory, and
8 if I don't remember, you tell me, will you?

9 Mr. Phillips. I will try my best.

10 The Chairman. Chief Counsel needs all the help he can
11 get.

12 Mr. Schwarz. I just want to pin down one thing that
13 we skipped over.

14 You did hear from the man you characterized as a wild
15 man, Major Marshall, you heard from someone that he was
16 thinking about assassinating Allende?

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And I put you the question, given your
19 own opposition to assassination -- and you testified that
20 nothing was done with Major Marshall, indeed you had him
21 kind of shunted aside.

22 Mr. Phillips. I made recommendations, and others de-
23 cided.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And in fact the record indicates that
25 he was not really seriously dealt with much, at least after

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

21

1 that but the question I put to you is, having heard of the
2 assassination concept, and recognizing that you were acting
3 under a broad charter to act in order to get rid of Allende,
4 recognizing further that you yourself didn't interpret that as
5 including assassination, but there were other people working
6 for you, and there were people working in Chile, and so forth,
7 why didn't you make it clear to other persons connected with
8 the matter that the general injunction to get rid of Allende
9 or to prevent Allende from taking power did not include
10 assassination.

11 Mr. Phillips. As I say, because I never realized that
12 this was an instance that was really leading in that
13 direction, honestly leading in that direction.

14 Secondly, no one ever raised the possibility that there
15 ever would be, up and down the line from the very junior man
16 to the very senior man. And the final reason was that I knew
17 those people that I was working with well, and it never occurred
18 to me that any one of them would accept the idea of, well,
19 the last thing that will work is to assassinate Allende, that
20 never occurred to me. That is why I never made a general
21 statement, fellows, let's don't talk about assassination.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to try and get an overview
23 of the Chilean operation through using a memorandum which
24 you have been shown this morning which we just received last
25 night.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY F. REILLY
DONALD A. REILLY
THE ARK

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

22

1 Mr. Phillips. I just had a chance to glance at it.

2 Mr. Schwarz. I think we can go through it piece by
3 piece, and any time you want to pause and look at it,
4 please do.

5 Would you mark as Phillips Exhibit 1 a memorandum which
6 has been placed in front of all the Senators separately. It
7 is dated December 2, 1970 from Richard Helms, Director, to
8 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. And it attaches a long, 23 page
9 document, dated 18 November 1970, "Report on CIA Chilean
10 Task Force Activities".

11 (The document referred to was
12 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 1
13 for identification.)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

23

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. Let's focus on the dates for a moment.

2 The 18 November memo is done after Allende has been confirmed
3 and has taken office, which took place when, on the 3rd or
4 4th of November?

5 Mr. Phillips. The 4th of November.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And he had been confirmed by the Chilean
7 congress on the 24th of October?

8 Mr. Phillips. On the 24th of October.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Having been the leader in the election that
10 took place on the 3rd of September.

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes -- was he the leader?

12 Mr. Schwarz. Having been slightly in the lead.

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. He did not get a majority, he got a
15 plurality.

16 Mr. Phillips. That is right. And that is why it had
17 to go to the Chilean congress for ratification.

18 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read to you sections from
19 what Mr. Helms furnished to Mr. Kissinger as a global descrip-
20 tion of what you had been doing, and then ask you a few ques-
21 tions about it.

22 On page 2 of the longer document Mr. Helms identified
23 the problem in the following way:

24 "Given the dismal prospects of a political formula being
25 worked out to prevent Allende's designation as president by

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

24

1 Congress, remaining alternatives centered around overcoming
2 the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean
3 military."

4 Is that a fair description of the problem with which he
5 were faced and the task which Track II -- we could use the term
6 Track II, by the way, to describe Task Force activities.

7 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is that a fair description of the problem
9 faced and the task that you had? It is a summary, but is it
10 a fair description?

11 Mr. Phillips. Incidentally, this was written after
12 I had returned to my job in Rio de Janeiro.

13 I don't think I could agree with the language as to over-
14 coming the apolitical, Constitutional oriented inertia of the
15 Chilean military. On the contrary, I would consider it a
16 positive force rather than an inertia.

17 So, the language I don't necessarily agree with. But
18 it is a fair statement of what they felt the problem was.

19 The Chairman. That language strikes me very forcefully,
20 because the same language could be used to describe the military
21 establishment of the U.S., apolitical, constitutionally-
22 oriented. And this in fact was a problem for us, was it
23 not, a problem to be overcome in Chile?

24 Mr. Phillips. The last real military move in Chile was
25 under President Balmaceda in 1891. And from that time on the

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
Courtesy THEARC

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

25

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & RAYL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Chilean military was a very model of democratic rectitude.
2 The Chairman. It isn't any more.
3 Mr. Phillips. It is not.
4 Mr. Schwarz. You know -- when I said you, Mr. Phillips,
5 I understand that your position was that this wasn't going
6 to work, and so forth, but I would like to use the "you"
7 as collectively describing the task force efforts.
8 Mr. Phillips. Fine.
9 Mr. Schwarz. And the task force knew, the U.S. Govern-
10 ment knew, that political solutions were not going to work,
11 and that a military solution was the only way in which the
12 objective of preventing Allende coming into power could be
13 realized?
14 Mr. Phillips. That appeared to be. There is a great ten-
15 dency in Latin America to look toward the military if you are
16 looking for a change, it happens frequently.
17 Mr. Schwarz. Let's turn to page 17 of Mr. Helms' docu-
18 ment. And he there describes what was the difficulty of pro-
19 ceeding with the military coup. And I would like to read to
20 you and then ask you if that is a fair characterization. I
21 will start at the bottom of page 16, under the heading
22 "Military coup" Mr. Helms reported the following to Dr.
23 Kissinger:
24 "After early October -- absent any evidence that Frei
25 was responding, politically speaking, to artificial respiration

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

26

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD B. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 a military coup increasingly suggested itself as the only
2 possible solution to the Allende problem."

3 Do you agree with it up to there?

4 Mr. Phillips. Once again I am not going to agree with
5 that language, but, yes, I do agree with it.

6 Mr. Schwarz. That is the substance of what you had to
7 do, you had to have the coup, is that right?

8 Mr. Phillips. There is no question about it.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Going on with the question:

10 "Anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and
11 the Carabineros" -- that is the police, isn't it?

12 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing:

14 "but were immobilized by: -- the tradition of military
15 respect for the Constitution;"

16 That was the problem, wasn't it?

17 Mr. Phillips. It was indeed.

18 Mr. Schwarz. "the public and private stance of General
19 Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict
20 adherence to the Constitution;" -- that was a problem, too, was
21 it not?

22 Mr. Phillips. It was.

23 Mr. Schwarz. So that you had to have a military solution.
24 And there was a problem, that the military believed in the con-
25 stitution and there was a particular problem in that General

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

1 Schneider, who was the head of the military, was a
2 constitutionalist, is that right?

3 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, let's skip down to the next comment
5 about General Schneider, which is further down the page, and
6 reads as follows:

7 "Although individual officers among the top leadership
8 of the military and Carabineros were pre-disposed to take certain
9 action, they felt the Army was central to a successful coup,
10 and, as long as General Schneider remained the head of the Army,
11 the Army could not be counted upon."

12 That is true, too, isn't it?

13 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

14 Mr. Schwarz. So the problem was to get rid of General
15 Schneider, isn't that fair?

16 Mr. Phillips. It depends on your definition of
17 to get rid of. To see that he was removed from office, yes.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what did you do, what did the Agency
19 do to insure that General Schneider would be -- and I will use
20 your term -- removed from office?

21 Mr. Phillips. Entertained any and all wild suggestions,
22 ideas, contacted people, like Marshall, probes here, probes
23 there, to find out.

24 Mr. Schwarz. You contacted Marshall, or Marshall contacted
25 you? By you I mean the Agency.

UNCLASSIFIED

1 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. I think we probably
2 contacted him, but I am not absolutely positive. But enter-
3 taining all possibilities, all options to see if there was
4 some way to do it. As I said before, however, that ultimate
5 option of assassination did not occur and was not mentioned.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Continue with what you actually did.
7 What did you actually do in order to insure, if I use your
8 words correctly, that General Schneider would not remain in
9 office, what were the things beside contacting people that the
10 Agency did?

11 Mr. Phillips. Well, to make it an absolutely accurate
12 description, certainly we are not at any one time zeroing in
13 on General Schneider as the only thing.

14 Mr. Schwarz. But that was not the problem, was it?

15 Mr. Phillips. It was a problem.

16 Mr. Schwarz. It was the main problem, wasn't it?
17 You needed a coup, and you knew the political solution
18 wouldn't work. You knew the greatest problem. You needed the
19 Army. You knew the problem in having the coup was that there
20 was a constitutional mentality, crazy constitutional mentality
21 in the Chilean military, right?

22 Mr. Phillips. I didn't say that, sir.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Okay. I am sorry. You knew that there
24 was a constitutional mentality and that that was the problem?

25 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

1 And consequently Schneider, I suppose, was probably the
2 number one problem.

3 Mr. Schwarz. He was the number one problem?

4 The Chairman. And he was the commander in chief of the
5 army.

6 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

7 Mr. Schwarz. And the leading constitutionalist?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

9 Mr. Schwarz. What did you do?

10 Mr. Phillips. Entertained all possibilities, talked
11 to people, and said what can you do, and looked to people
12 to support, and looked for General Viaux with his ideas, and
13 turned those off. And looked toward the Valenzuela group, I think
14 it was. And they seemed to have much more capability and to
15 be much more serious, and so forth. I suppose if someone said,
16 try to bribe General Schneider, and someone said, all right,
17 let's do it, then someone else said, General Schneider
18 can't be bribed.

19 And those men went so far as the kidnapping of General
20 Schneider. And we were aware of that.

21 Mr. Schwarz. You were aware of and approved, didn't
22 you, the kidnapping of General Schneider?

23 Mr. Phillips. Not in the case of General Viaux, because
24 we turned him off. But in the other case we were aware that
25 part of their plan was the possibility of a kidnapping, yes.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

30

1 Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through [REDACTED]
2 whom we will come to in a moment, \$50,000 if they could
3 accomplish it, didn't you?
4 Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.
5 Mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt
6 on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to
7 help accomplish the kidnapping?
8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.
9 Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Val-
10 enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?
11 Mr. Phillips. That is true.
12 Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a
13 kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that,
14 didn't you?
15 Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be
16 used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their
17 plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe-
18 cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was --
19 the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people
20 need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin
21 America.
22 And they said something about, their own arms could be
23 identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified.
24 I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was
25 just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

31

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 very well be used.

2 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to come back to some more
3 things in this document. There are some very important state-
4 ments in it. But draw the line again. You thought assassina-
5 tion was a bad thing?

6 Mr. Phillips. I did.

7 Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand, you believed, at least
8 in your capacity in performing your duties, whether you
9 personally believed it, you believed that the kidnapping of
10 General Schneider was a good thing?

11 Mr. Phillips. Absolutely not, since I said in my
12 personal capacity I thought the whole idea was a bum idea.

13 Mr. Schwarz. I tried to put you in your official
14 capacity.

15 Mr. Phillips. In my official capacity I realized that
16 the removal from office of General Schneider was an important
17 element of any successful military coup. I make that state-
18 ment in the context of what I have said previously that
19 I didn't really think it was going to work all along.

20 The Chairman. Let's say that your testimony is very
21 lucid, and I commend you for it. I think you are telling us
22 in a way that makes it easy for the Committee to follow.

23 And the distinction you draw between your personal view and
24 your official duties is helpful to the Committee. I just
25 want to encourage you, because your testimony is exceptionally

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

32

1 good.

2 Mr. Phillips. Thank you, sir.

3 Mr. Schwarz. That is why I knew that he would remem-
4 ber when we wanted to come back to that meeting, because you
5 are a very helpful and good witness. I concur in your
6 comment.

7 In your official capacity you thought the kidnapping was
8 a good thing?

9 Mr. Phillips. I thought it was a necessary thing if
10 there was to be a coup.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And the submachine guns were made by the
12 Agency with the knowledge that they might be used in the
13 kidnapping?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, put together, if you can, and ex-
16 plain how you fit, how you make them consistent, the attitude
17 against assassination and the supply of very deadly weapons.
18 You will agree that submachine guns are very deadly weapons,
19 do you not?

20 Mr. Phillips. I do, sir.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Put together the attitude against
22 assasinations and the supply of very deadly weapons to be
23 used in a very dangerous activity, which is a kidnapping --
24 and remember, of course, that the man did die.

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I do.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

33

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. Although not through those submachine
2 guns.

3 Mr. Phillips. May I ask you to rephrase that question.
4 I am not quite sure of it.

5 Mr. Schwarz. It is not seeking a fact, Mr. Phillips,
6 it is seeking an explanation of how you can make consistent
7 on the one hand your testimony of opposition to assassinations,
8 which is given with great credibility from its appearance,
9 how can you put that together on the one hand with your testi-
10 mony as to what was actually done as far as supplying deadly
11 weapons for a purpose which was highly dangerous, in a
12 context where in fact the man died when he was kidnapped.

13 Mr. Phillips. Well, of course, this is a very complex
14 and complicated question that you are asking. I think that
15 the answer is that if you find that you are going to involve
16 yourself in foreign endeavors, that you very seldom find a
17 situation in which you are capable of placing stop and go
18 buttons on the machinery that you have set into motion.

19 In the Dominican Republic the involvement of the Agency
20 of the U.S. Government in the death of -- I like to think of
21 that not as an assassination, but tyrannicide -- I just don't
22 see how in the world anyone could have pushed a stop button
23 for the general Tony Imbert type of thing.

24 The same thing is true when you go past the line of
25 meddling around politically and trying to persuade people and

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

34

1 paying off congressmen. You are in a situation where, of
2 course, anything can happen. And it is just a fact. And so
3 there is no explanation for it except that it is one of those
4 things that you accept as a part of a pretty tough business.

5 Fortunately it doesn't happen too often but it does
6 happen.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Let's focus on your personal attitude
8 now instead of your official attitude.

9 Is that one of the reasons you were personally opposed
10 to what the CIA was doing?

11 Mr. Phillips. Let me make one thing very clear for the
12 record. I did not come back, and I wasn't told, you are going
13 to do this thing, and then I started objecting and say I
14 am going to resign or blow this or run to Congress, or any-
15 thing like that, I did not do that. I was called back to do
16 what was almost a mechanical job. The decision had been
17 made, and they were using my expertise about Chile, since I
18 had lived there many years. I didn't make a big theatrical
19 show. But in my opinion it was one of the two times
20 during 25 years that I seriously considered if I shouldn't
21 just step out the door. I decided not to, because two times
22 out of a career of 25 years put in balance with all the rest
23 seems to me to be a reasonable ratio.

24 I did realize, obviously, having been involved in things
25 before, that we were getting into something where people could

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

35

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 be hurt. Indeed, I thought that if there were a military
2 coup, that theremight be two weeks of street fighting in
3 Santiago, and perhaps months of fighting and thousands of
4 deaths in the countryside.

5 When President Balmoceda was deposed in 1891 --
6 he was very much like Allende in many respects, he was a liberal
7 he committed suicide the day after he left the presidency
8 rather than go to trial -- there was a civil war which lasted
9 for months, and perhaps 10,000 Chileans were killed.

10 I was aware that I was involved in a process that
11 might lead to that. God knows I knew I was involved in
12 something where one man might get killed.

13 Mr. Schwarz. That raises another sort of judgmental or
14 philosophical question.

15 You said earlier that had you been asked to assassinate
16 someone then you would have resigned.

17 Mr. Phillips. I certainly would have. I have resigned
18 twice for lesser reasons.

19 Mr. Schwarz. There is a question that faces the
20 Committee more generally. What is the line that you draw
21 in your mind between a direct targeted assassination which
22 would have caused you to resign --

23 Mr. Phillips. Two.

24 Mr. Schwarz. -- and your knowledge that a coup effort,
25 which you were bothered by, but which would not have caused

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

36

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 you to resign, your knowledge that a coup effort would involve,
2 as you say, deaths, and might indeed lead to civil war
3 which would involve thousands of deaths, what is the distinc-
4 tion that you draw?

5 Mr. Phillips. Sir, what is the distinction I draw
6 from the time I was a bombardier in World War II and pushed
7 a target button, and hundreds and perhaps thousands of
8 people died?

9 Mr. Schwarz. I am not criticizing you, I am just trying
10 to get on the record what the distinction is in your mind.

11 Mr. Phillips. Most of my experience has been in Latin
12 America. Latin America is a land of violence, so much that
13 you just don't understand. It is inevitable that if you
14 are engaged in any sort of movement something can happen.

15 Now, consider the duties of a Station Chief overseas.
16 If there is a movement afoot to do anything to a leader, to
17 try to change a government, a palace coup, indeed
18 an assassination, that Station Chief is derelict professionally
19 unless he has an agent in that group which can report to
20 U.S. policy makers that there is going to be a change of
21 government.

22 So, there you have a situation where a CIA agent who is
23 there just for information purposes is involved, and that is
24 one extreme.

25 Then it goes down to the business of, well, shall we

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

37

1 wink at these people and tell them that if they do take
2 over the government the U.S. will probably look on them favor-
3 ably.

4 They always want to know about that. They want to have
5 the green light before they go.

6 And so it runs the whole emotional range.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Let's get back to my question.

8 In this case you were at the range on the coup side,
9 not merely of getting intelligence or saying that you were
10 generally in favor, but you were actually acting to foment
11 the coup, including the supply of weapons, including
12 money, and so forth.

13 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Again, I ask the question, in the light of
15 your testimony that had you been asked to assassinate, you
16 would have resigned, whereas your knowledge that you were
17 fomenting a coup, and in that were successful numerous people
18 might, and indeed probably would be, killed, you were un-
19 comfortable, but you would not have resigned.

20 What is the line that you draw?

21 Mr. Phillips. The answer to your question, sir, is that
22 I didn't do it because I felt that I couldn't secondguess
23 the President of the U.S.

24 Mr. Schwarz. You can't fit that with your testimony
25 about, you would have resigned if you had been asked to

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

38

1 assassinate someone?

2 Mr. Phillips. I would have.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Again, what is the difference? And I
4 believe, Mr. Phillips, that there is in your mind a difference.
5 And I am not criticizing you. I hope you understand that. I
6 am trying to have you articulate for the Committee what the
7 distinction is that you perceive between a target assassina-
8 tion and other action which also involves the risk of death and,
9 indeed substantial deaths.

10 Mr. Phillips. All right.

11 I suppose the answer is that a planned assassination
12 against any human being would be completely unacceptable to me
13 as a U.S. Government option in any case. I have accepted over
14 many years the fact that with the authority of the Presidency,
15 that if the U.S. Government tried to change things in another
16 country, I was a part of the team that worked on those changes,
17 and I went along in that profession for a number of years.

18 The answer would always be, in any given situation, you
19 want me to do this, I can't do that, but I am just going to
20 leave.

21 I also had the feeling that if people that considered
22 themselves the least bit sensitive resigned every time they
23 were given a dirty trick to do, we would soon have an in-
24 telligence service full of bums who would respond immediately
25 to almost anything.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
EDWARD
COM, THEARC

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

39

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 I don't want to belabor the fact of my opposition to
2 this 1970 episode, but I do believe that my recommendations
3 were rather vital in cutting off the true things, and keeping
4 the things in some perspective. And I like to think that it
5 is one of those things that you can do better within the
6 system than out.

7 Mr. Schwarz. And again on the assassination front,
8 that would have been so repugnant that there you would have
9 resigned?

10 Mr. Phillips. I certainly would have.

11 Senator Hart of Colorado. Counsel, have we ascertained
12 on the record yet whether there was any discussion at any time
13 in connection with Track II about assassinations?

14 Mr. Schwarz. We have asked him, and he said there was
15 not.

16 And then we asked him if he didn't hear that a Major
17 Marshall in Chile had been talking about that.

18 And he said he did.

19 Mr. Phillips. And we turned Major Marshall off.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the General Viaux
21 group generally?

22 Mr. Phillips. We never heard any plan, Senator, that
23 they planned to assassinate. It seemed to me that I heard many
24 times plans to kidnap, a great deal of that. But never did
25 we hear anyone say that we knew Marshall, whom we considered a

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

40

1 screwball, had a high-powered rifle, and among other things,
2 he said I will do this, I never reall that we ever heard that
3 he or Valenzuela or anybody else proposed the option of
4 assassinating Allende.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Or assassinating Schneider?

6 Mr. Phillips. Or assassinating Schneider.

7 Senator Hart of Colorado. But the possibility was
8 open in everybody's mind that resistance during the course of
9 a kidnap attempt could lead to somebody's death, the principal
10 particularly.

11 Mr. Phillips. Unfortunately, I think it occurred to most
12 of us after the fact. But it always obviously was there as a
13 possibility.

14 Mr. Schwarz. I want to come back to the kidnapping and
15 the guns.

16 You have already testified that you had discussed the
17 kidnapping option and supported it at least as far as
18 Valenzuela was concerned.

19 From where did you get the authority to support that
20 option?

21 Mr. Phillips. I didn't have that authority.

22 Mr. Schwarz. You say you didn't have it on your own
23 without checking with someone?

24 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Who did you check with?

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

41

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. I honestly don't know. I checked with
2 Mr. Broe, who was my boss, and with Mr. Karamessines and others.
3 Whether they went outside of our building to get further
4 authority, and if they did, with whom they talked, I just
5 don't know.

6 Mr. Schwarz. I am just trying to find out what you know.
7 And you went as far at least as Karamessines?

8 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And he approved?

10 Mr. Phillips. Approved what specific thing?

11 Mr. Schwarz. Let's have two things.

12 First, you approved the aid which was given at least to
13 the Valenzuela group in connection with their kidnapping
14 efforts.

15 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I was sitting there, and if a message
16 was to go to Chile saying that a traveler was arriving on an
17 airplane flight, I would release that cable. The minute that
18 it began to be political or important or anything like that,
19 it went up the line. Those messages were approved up the
20 line.

21 Mr. Schwarz. So certainly the kidnapping involvement was
22 approved to your knowledge at least to the Karamessines
23 level?

24 Mr. Phillips. Oh, yes, definitely.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And the passage of the submachine guns

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

42

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY F. REED

FOUNDATION

THEATER

1 was approved at least at the Karamessines level?

2 Mr. Phillips. At least.

3 First of all, I think it is a simple rule in the
4 Agency that you don't pass articles to anyone under any
5 circumstances without going to the DDO, and DDP.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And then that was then in Karamessines'
7 hands?

8 Mr. Phillips. That was then in Mr. Karamessines'
9 hands.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything at all about authori-
11 ties above Mr. Karamessines for either the kidnapping support
12 or the passage of the submachine guns?

13 Mr. Phillips. Mr. Karamessine obviously reported to
14 Mr. Helms. I didn't go up with him frequently to see Mr.
15 Helms, and as I said before, not more than three or four times
16 during the six or seven week period. Obviously he spoke with
17 Mr. Helms. When those meetings took place and what they
18 decided I was not privy to.

19 Mr. Schwarz. But do you have anything in your mind
20 at all with respect to Mr. Helms' knowledge of or approval of
21 either the kidnapping support or the passage of the guns?

22 Mr. Phillips. I do not. It would be my assumption --
23 this is certainly something that Mr. Karamessines would have
24 discussed with him, but that is an assumption.

25 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to go back to the document

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

43

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 again and look at a few more things in it.

2 If you would look at page 3 --

3 Mr. Phillips. The first page, sir?

4 Mr. Schwarz. Page 3 of the long document --

5 Senator Schweiker. Which tab is that?

6 Mr. Schwarz. It is the loose document that has the
7 covered page from Helms to Kissinger. We have gone through it
8 at length on the problems that General Schneider posed to them,
9 and we are now picking up a few other matters. This is a summary
10 made by Director Helms for Mr. Kissinger after the event.

11 On page 3 the following is contained:

12 "Subsequently" -- and that subsequently means after your
13 task force was set up -- "Subsequently, an 'illegal' team started
14 filtering into Santiago. It consisted of four CIA officers with
15 the appearance, language, and experience to sustain the fiction
16 of various foreign nationalities."

17 Now, those people were also called false flag officers.

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Why did you want people who could sustain
20 the fiction of various foreign nationalities.

21 Mr. Phillips. Security pure and simple. The proposal
22 was to try and do something in Chile, and it occurred to me that
23 to ask people who were assigned to the U.S. Embassy to go out
24 and do this thing was completely unacceptable from a security
25 standpoint.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

44

Phone (Area 202) 544-4000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we
2 establish what I called a false flag base of people that would
3 go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the
4 chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much
5 less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

6 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is
7 this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that
8 he asked for it after I came over.

9 Mr. Treverton. It is not.

10 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which
11 unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is
12 relatively simple.

13 This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970,
14 and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to
15 the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the
16 purposes of setting up the false flag office --

17 Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

18 Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base
19 will enter and leave Chile with false documents and operate as
20 a representative of his country rather than as an American".

21 That is right, isn't it?

22 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

24 "Having at least one key [redacted] and one key [redacted]
25 would be vital, and we have candidates."

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

1 And you did that.

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These
4 officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap
5 potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any
6 Chilean."

7 That is right, isn't it?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

10 Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall,
11 that sort of thing.

12 Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II
13 activities?

14 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can-
16 didates who can successfully pose as [REDACTED] intelligence
17 officers." You did that, didn't you?

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded
20 [REDACTED] ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a [REDACTED]

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

22 Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would
23 the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like [REDACTED] would
24 be blamed if something went wrong.

25 Mr. Phillips.. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me.

UNCLASSIFIED

46

1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] However, that was it. It was a
3 devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that
4 if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone
5 other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is
6 not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying,
7 why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets,
8 is not true.

9 But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents
10 should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that
11 was the idea.

12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were
13 their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go
14 to their death swearing they were [REDACTED] or whatever?

15 Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic,
16 Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And
17 I briefed them, and I think what I said to them was, this
18 is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have
19 to go if you don't want to, because you could get in real trouble.

20 And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help
21 you.

22 So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the [REDACTED] that you were
24 sending someone down to pose as [REDACTED] and his instruc-
25 tions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose

UNCLASSIFIED

47

1 as [REDACTED] were approached?

2 Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest
3 dreams to do that.

4 Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between con-
5 tinuing intelligence services were things that were
6 very important to preserve, and that we had very close and
7 delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

8 Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a
9 man [REDACTED] would be quite unhappy with us. But I
10 thought that was better than letting the world know that was
11 a U.S. Citizen down there.

12 Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27
13 to say this:

14 "Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by
15 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate
16 and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi-
17 bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure-
18 ly."

19 So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging
20 from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services --
22 not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living
23 overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you
24 are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana
25 and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

48

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the
2 Soviets, from us, or [REDACTED]

3 So, it is not an unusual practice.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing
5 in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year
6 involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered
7 by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was
8 Chile.

9 And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

10 Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs
11 of Station course, which is a training course for people who
12 are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

13 When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines
14 to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to
15 protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might
16 have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there

17 [REDACTED] And I just wasn't sure that I
18 wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de-
19 cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is
20 doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go
21 along.

22 Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation
23 between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin-
24 ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding
25 it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

49

1 a duly elected government, and also to kidnap a general who
2 believed in the constitution.

3 How would you personally feel if someone did that to
4 our country?

5 Mr. Phillips. I would find it completely unacceptable,
6 Senator.

7 Senator Schweiker. And wouldn't you be inclined to
8 strike back, and wouldn't you also feel that we would have
9 some kind of revenge as an instrument of our foreign policy
10 in retaliation, if someone did what you did to Chile to our
11 country wouldn't you feel that way as an American?

12 Mr. Phillips. I suppose that I would, Senator, and I
13 certainly understand how people would feel. I myself have
14 been receiving threatening telephone calls about Chile
15 recently, and so forth. And I can understand why people are
16 terribly concerned. You can certainly understand why Chileans
17 as these facts have come out, are terribly disturbed.

18 Senator Schweiker. How can you swear that with building
19 a foreign policy or relationship with other countries when we
20 don't accept that test applied to ourselves? I don't under-
21 stand why we would apply a test to other countries that we
22 don't apply to ourselves. It just seems to me that we are
23 getting into an area where we are just asking for trouble,
24 and building an anti-American image around the world.

25 Maybe you can give me some understanding I lack in this

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

1 regard.

2 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I am sure that I could not do that.
3 I think what you have posed is the basic dilemma of a secret
4 organization in a free society when that organization is
5 given extra curricula jobs to do. And I certainly hope that
6 as a result of these hearings that that phrase upon which the
7 Agency and the U.S. intelligence services have relied over the
8 years is taken care of, and that is that the charter of 1947
9 said that we would collect intelligence, we would conduct
10 counter-intelligence, and then that terribly vague phrase
11 about other such functions and duties.

12 And it just seems to me that that is a decision to be made
13 certainly outside of the intelligence community by people such
14 as you, Senator. And it is the only answer.

15 I just don't think that we could have the present problems
16 if the third part of that charter had said, and other such
17 functions and duties such as, A, B, C, D, E, F, period.
18 And it is that looseness.

19 Senator Schweiker. We had before this Committee the
20 person who drafted that, and he said he had no intention at
21 all of saying what is now being practiced. So, his intention
22 was very clear in the wording of it.

23 But what I am coming back to is a little bit of how we
24 as a country rationalize any attempt to overthrow a legitimate
25 government. I realize you feel the intelligence community needs

1 it, and so do I. But I certainly don't need it.

2 I think we need it for the purpose of overthrowing the
3 government of the other legitimate countries. It seems to
4 me spying and covert activities are one thing, and throwing
5 a duly elected government out the window is just inviting
6 all kinds of anti-American, ugly American reactions, and it
7 is contrary to our philosophy approach.

8 And isn't this really inviting the very criticism of
9 the intelligence community that you personally are concerned
10 about?

11 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I certainly agree with your
12 statement. I am not sure that we should be doing it. It seems
13 to me that this is one of the vital decisions that you are
14 going to be making, do we do it or don't we. If we were
15 having a caucus and I were to add any personal elements, I think
16 my vote would be with the side that said, let's skip it,
17 let's don't do it.

18 Now, I do differentiate between the two types of poli-
19 tical cover actions that are conducted overseas. And in
20 explaining this I tried to talk about covert action with a
21 capital C and a capital A. That is Chile, secret army, and
22 Laos, and that sort of thing. And I think this is a very
23 valid subject for debate as to whether we should do this. Cer-
24 tainly this should be decided by people outside the community.

25 I would hate to think that our capability were destroyed

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

52

1 or allowed to atrophy to do what I call covert action with a
2 small c and a small a, that is to call on friends to assist
3 the U.S. Government with some pretty valid things, such as in-
4 hibiting the flow of hard drugs to the U.S., or countering
5 terrorism or protecting the lives of American diplomats. But
6 when you are talking about the things that you are talking
7 about, from a personal standpoint I think it would be well if
8 we sat down and had a meeting with you, Senator.

9 So, you are asking me to make a personal judgment.

10 Senator Schweiker. I appreciate your forthrightness.
11 And, of course, I am reminded of the story where we couldn't
12 even prosecute a CIA agent who was doing the very thing that
13 you thought we ought to be doing about bringing drugs into
14 this country.

15 And here again was the intelligence operation doing it.

16 That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. I think that that is a very useful
18 exchange.

19 There was nothing in this Chilean operation that had
20 anything to do with the use of clandestine methods for the
21 purpose of collecting intelligence. This was not in that
22 sense a true intelligence operation. Nor are any of these
23 covert operations with a capital C and a capital O related in
24 any way to the collection of intelligence. They are efforts
25 to manipulate and control events abroad.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

2 The Chairman. And when we do this in this hemisphere,
3 of course, we run counter to our solemn treaty pledged not to
4 do it.

5 Mr. Phillips. Sir, as a footnote to that I would like
6 to add that in 25 years, after having engaged in covert opera-
7 tions, I suppose, as much as anybody, I am not aware of a
8 single one that we weren't asked to do by the executive. And
9 especially in the early years it was sort of hard to say to
10 the Commander in Chief, that is a bum idea.

11 On this Chile thing, for instance, I assure you that
12 those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just
13 about universally said, my God, why are we given this assign-
14 ment, approached from all standpoints?

15 The first reaction from the station when they heard we
16 wanted to do this was, you are sort of out of your mind,
17 this is not going to work, and so forth.

18 And so obviously in a career in intelligence over
19 the years you have these hard moments. But the fellow over
20 on the other side of the desk talking about doing them is the
21 representative at least of the Commander in Chief. That is
22 the problem.

23 Mr. Schwarz. As you were sitting around or talking
24 on the telephone, or having lunch together, or getting communi-
25 cations back and forth, you all, apparently not only you in

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

54

1 Washington but the people in Chile, testified that you thought
2 the chances at best were two out of 20 or two out of a
3 hundred?

4 Mr. Phillips. It never passed two out of 20.

5 Mr. Schwarz. You just testified that the people down
6 at the Station thought it was a crazy idea. And you really
7 got an atmosphere of the people in the Station having substan-
8 tial doubt about the wisdom and efficacy of what you were
9 being asked to do.

10 And, I take it, since you were working very hard on this,
11 you and your friends talked about the subject from time to
12 time and asked, why are we doing this, what is the point,
13 right?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes, we did.

15 Mr. Schwarz. In those talks I take it you must have
16 on occasion tried to figure out what was motivating the
17 persons who were pushing the Agency. And if my assumption is
18 correct, as human beings you must have done that. And do
19 you agree with me that is a correct assumption?

20 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And since you did do it, what were your
22 assumptions as to what was motivating the persons who were
23 pushing the Agency?

24 Mr. Phillips. These, of course, are just assumptions.

25 Mr. Schwarz. I understand that.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

55

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could understand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

4 Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that 5 he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32 6 years before he was elected.

7 Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ardent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that 8 we had a visit from a man who had the code name of [REDACTED] he 9 was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in 10 rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot 11 at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the 12 same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send 13 22,000 rather than 400. 14

15 So, I can understand why they thought this was going, 16 in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our 17 interests. But that is an assumption.

18 It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear 19 that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The difference 20 was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice 21 and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to 22 Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are 23 going to have to use violence.

24 I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper 25 where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

1 we are going to get tough to keep this revolution going.

2 A I think he was in Havana and was told, look what
3 happened in Chile, Allende tried to carry out the socialist
4 revolution within the framework of the constitution, it
5 has never worked before and it is never going to work again.

6 That was the difference.

7 The Chairman. Were you aware during this period that
8 the IT&T offere the CIA a million dollars to prevent Allende
9 from taking power?

10 Mr. Phillips. Senator, I heard of some of that. I
11 was not a part of it in the sense that I was down in the shop
12 dealing with the Chile things, getting the cables out and
13 seeing that the typists got in on time, and that sort of thing.
14 And I knew there were talks about that, but I am simply not an
15 authority on it.

16 The Chairman. Then you were aware that there was a
17 pressure from our business community to do something about
18 Allende because of the investments of American corporations in
19 Chile.

20 Mr. PHillips. Yes, sir, I was aware. And I was aware
21 of it in a sort of vague sense that there is part of Track I
22 over there. And I was in the unit operating Track II, and
23 consequently did not participate in these things, and didn't
24 meet any of these people. But I was aware of it, yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz. You drew the distinction between Allende

~~Top Secret~~ UNCLASSIFIED

57

1 and Castro, which was that Allende, while having objectives
2 that were Marxist, did not choose, your perception was,
3 to use tactics which were violent or totalitarian.

4 Mr. Phillips. He used some heavy tactics, some rough
5 ones, but not the kind that were usually associated with such
6 a state. He gave the press a hard time. They find it hard
7 to operate, and labor gives them problems. But essentially
8 he tried to conduct a socialist revolution.

9 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read into the record
10 two more documents which we just received from the White House
11 last night.

12 Senator Schweiker. I can appreciate your forthright-
13 ness, Mr. Phillips. But in essence you are saying that we
14 proved Castro right, we proved him right that the only way
15 for a Marxist revolution to succeed is by violence, by our
16 plots to overthrow Allende we really proved Castro right. I
17 think that is the irony of the whole Chilean chapter.

18 Mr. Phillips. I suppose that that must be true.

19 Senator Schweiker. I suppose Allende would say, even
20 the U.S. wouldn't permit a democratic accession of power of a
21 Marxist government, so the only possible way is to shoot
22 everybody.

23 Which I think gets back to the basic question the Chair-
24 man and I were discussing, is where the philosophy of these
25 end up.

~~Top Secret~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

58

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. I suppose I was proving Fidel Castro right.
2 In my first public declaration after leaving the Agency I
3 found myself saying almost immediately, I agree with Fidel Cas-
4 tro about something, because Senator McGovern had just been in
5 Cuba, and Castro had made a statement ahat he had not been
6 involved in the Kennedy assassination.

7 And I said, as far as my particular slice of the pie is
8 concerned, I agree with him 100 percent, because my job at that
9 time was in Mexico City watching the Cuban Embassy, and
10 I am absolutely convinced that Oswald went there and was re-
11 buffed by the Cubans.

12 Senator Schweiker. It seems to me that any primary
13 course that any Marxist gives to any of their followers from
14 now on will cite the Allende case as to how America is never
15 going to permit the Marxist government to be voted in freely,
16 and they are going to say that the only way to succeed is
17 to do what Castro did. And we have proved their point, which
18 I think is really right.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Further on Senator Schweiker's points,
20 I would like to read to you excerpts from the two documents
21 that were sent by the American Ambassador --

22 Senator Mondale. Could I just ask one question?

23 You were the Station chief in Chile?

24 Mr. Phillips. No, sir.

25 Senator Mondale. You were in charge of these covert

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

59

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 activities?

2 Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED] and was called back in 1970 for
4 six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

5 Senator Mondale. Now, in that position you familiarized
6 yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on,
7 and tried to become as expert as you could in the political
8 forces and so on?

9 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator,
10 one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived
11 for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

12 Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I
13 just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused
14 Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the
15 democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff
16 on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he
17 was pursuing, is that correct?

18 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but
19 he indeed acted that way.

20 Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur-
21 suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with
22 the population support under constitutional system?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

24 Senator Mondale. Thank you.

25 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

60

1 with those questions, and in connection with the line you drew
2 between violence and less violence, two comments made by the
3 Ambassador to Chile, Mr. Korry, to Dr. Kissinger, one dated
4 1 September 1970, right in the middle of this, and another one
5 dated 21 September 1972, for some reason. Here is what the
6 Ambassador recommended to Dr. Kissinger in the first document
7 dated September 21, 1970:

8 "Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our
9 power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation
10 and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accel-
11 erate the harsh feature of a Communist society in Chile".

12 The second document of the same date:

13 "If confronted with a choice to ease Chile's economic
14 plight under an Allende regime, or to hasten economic collapse,
15 and thereby forcing Allende to adopt the harsh features of
16 a police state earlier than planned, the Ambassador would not
17 hesitate to opt for and see to it that economically speaking
18 Chile would go to hell faster."

19 That is really what we were thinking about doing, and that
20 is what we do, wasn't it?

21 Mr. Phillips. I believe that would fit under the
22 Track I category, yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. And it is what we did?

24 Mr. Phillips. I think it was perhaps what was tried. I
25 don't believe Track I succeeded at all.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

61

1 The Chairman. This was the objective of our policies?

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

3 Senator Schweiker. But Track II was just an extension
4 of that same principle, the force of violence?

5 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Let us recap where we are so far.

7 We needed Track II because the political solution
8 wouldn't work. The military was constitutional, and General
9 Schneider was the greatest constitutionalist, so we had to
10 do something to get rid of him. And that led to, he was
11 kidnapped.

12 On the other side of events, Allende was not sufficiently
13 violent, so it was important for us to take steps in order
14 to make Chile go to hell faster economically, so that violence
15 and violent tactics by Allende would be accelerated, and the
16 Chilean people would be condemned to poverty, is that a fair
17 summary of where we are so far?

18 Mr. Phillips. Sir, that is a rather broad statement of
19 policy. Generally I certainly accept it, yes. It is a part
20 of the things that were going on, simply because the Ambassador
21 sent a cable saying that I don't think that necessarily says
22 that that is U.S. policy. Ambassador Korry was formerly a
23 journalist, and very prolific with the pen. As I recall, we used
24 to refer to them as Korrygrams when they came. So I am not
25 sure that his single statements constitute policy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Top Secret~~ UNCLASSIFIED 62

1 And certainly the idea of causing such violence that
2 he had to go was very much a part of it.

3 I also think that if there should be the option to do
4 something in the United Nations that the policy would have been
5 different, and so on.

6 But referring to CIA's role, we were given the action
7 job, yes.

8 The Chairman. Senator Hart.

9 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, how long did you
10 serve for the Agency in Latin America?

11 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I began in 1950 as a contract agent
12 in Santiago, Chile. I became a staff officer in 1955-56,
13 something like that.

14 I served twice in Cuba, Mexico City, the Dominican
15 Republic, Brazil, and Venezuela before returning here in the
16 summer of 1973 as the Chief of Latin American Operations, a
17 total of 25 years.

18 Senator Hart of Colorado. And you were in Latin
19 America before becoming a contract agent for the Agency?

20 Mr. Phillips. I arrived in Latin America in 1948 to
21 write the great American play. I never finished it.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. So, that would make your total
23 career experience with Latin America generally 28 years?

24 Mr. Phillips. Perhaps more. My first trip to Latin
25 America was in 1945 or 1946, when I went to visit a brother

~~Top Secret~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

63

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 who lived in Mexico for a weekend and stayed six months. So,
2 it really began in 1946.

3 Senator Hart of Colorado. With that background of pre-
4 agency experience in a number of Latin American countries,
5 could you tell us what your personal reaction to the instructions
6 you received regarding Chile were? Leaving aside emotions
7 of challenge and so forth, rationally did you think this was
8 a reasonable course of conduct for the Agency to be involved
9 in?

10 Mr. Phillips. We have discussed this previously,
11 Senator. And in essence what I said was that arriving here
12 and having been told we had decided to go ahead with this,
13 and I was sort of put in charge of the mechanical side of
14 getting it going, I had some reactions. The first was per-
15 sonal and not germane.

16 The second was professional: it was a bad idea because
17 it obviously wouldn't work, and the risk potential was so
18 terribly high. And I felt that way throughout this seven-week
19 period, I felt very strongly. That is in essence how I felt.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you feel from your ex-
21 perience in the Agency that there are adequate channels for
22 people at your level, case officer or above, to react upward
23 when you think the plans are bad, express yourself, dissent,
24 and so forth?

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I would suspect that it is

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

64

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 probably easier in the CIA than in most government
2 agencies. I have known of numerous cases of people in the
3 CIA saying, to hell with that, I want to go talk to the
4 Director, and walking into the Director's office. I have
5 seen that on many occasions. I suppose that over the years
6 we have become more of a bureaucracy than before. But cer-
7 tainly in the early years it was a place that really was sort
8 of simulating because it encouraged dissent. And there
9 was quite a lot of that, there is no question about that.

10 Senator Hart of Colorado. So, in your experience there
11 are not a lot of these half-baked schemes that get going and
12 are perpetuated because people are afraid to disagree insti-
13 tutionally?

14 Mr. Phillips. Well, people are certainly cautious about
15 disagreeing when they are faced with a situation which I be-
16 lieve essentially was the Chilean one, bam, this is what
17 we want to do. There was not much time for argument, the
18 sort of thing like that. But in anything that is internally
19 discussed before, it gets a very thorough discussion before it
20 gets done. But I think there is a proclivity that if the Direc-
21 tor calls in people and says, we have been given this assign-
22 ment, that you go ahead and do it because you are a pro-
23 fessional.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Does this make a great deal
25 of difference if that is prefaced that we have been given an

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

65

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

MARY F. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 assignment by the President and by the White House?

2 Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference
3 today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why
4 should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game.

5 The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the
6 word.

7 And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that
8 we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

9 Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

10 I call your attention in our briefing books to what is
11 Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21
12 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author
13 of that cable?

14 Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating
15 officer, yes.

16 Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

17 Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the
18 right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating
19 officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know
20 the situation.

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess
22 is what I am after.

23 Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably
24 written by [REDACTED] and perhaps myself, perhaps it was
25 joint. But [REDACTED] wrote an awful lot of them. But by

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1 putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was
2 a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is
3 the one that accepts the responsibility.

4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has
5 the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the follow-
6 ing sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending
7 us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et
8 cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have
9 to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes
10 on the stars.

11 What does that mean in Agency talk?

12 Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real
13 seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye,
15 however.

16 Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed
17 a joint venture, I can promise that that was [REDACTED]
18 contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand
19 why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking
20 back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four
21 o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just
22 didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I
23 am not sure what it means even now.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems
25 to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

67

1 last six months.

2 The Chairman. That whole scenario is rather captivating
3 if you go back to page 5, where it begins with:

4 "From your previous communications it is our understand-
5 ing that Frei should seek the designation of cabinet, form new
6 cabinet comprised entirely of military, Frei appoints acting
7 president, Frei departs from Chile, Chile has military junta
8 which supersedes new elections, and Frei runs the new elections
9 with our help he wins, for reasons noted in paragraph 6 below".

10 This seems to be an impartial undersanding on our part
11 of what you have in mind.

12 Mr. Phillips. Rather than being eyes on the stars, I
13 would say that that was pie in the sky.

14 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

15 Mr. Schwarz. There is a lot of nice language in it:
16 The purpose of this cable is not to test your _____
17 nerve but catch other bureaucratic exercise. The purpose is
18 to give some focus to our efforts, and so forth and so on.

19 I would like to go back to the document that was
20 marked Exhibit 1, Mr. Helms --

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. Before you do that, Counsel,
22 this pie in the sky gets back to the question I was trying to
23 get at.

24 Wasn't there anyone around that could tell the President
25 of the U.S. that that is exactly what this was, could or would

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

68

1 tell him.

2 Mr. Phillips. I tried to in the sense of where I fit
3 in the picture. And I certainly don't want this record to re-
4 flect that I was a party, and that I really knew everything
5 that was happening. I wasn't, I was a professional going
6 along with it even though I didn't think it was a good idea.
7 But I tried to influence events by convincing people that we
8 were engaged in something that was a bad idea, that wouldn't
9 work. And I believe one of the documents that the Committee
10 has allowed me to review was a memorandum of 13 October in which
11 Dr. Kissinger was told, we believe the chances of General
12 Viaux doing anything are only one percent, or one-half of
13 one percent, or something.

14 And so the role, the limited role that I played, every
15 once in a while at a meeting I would say, well, the odds
16 aren't even two percent, they aren't one percent. That was
17 the extent to which I did it.

18 Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you have any feeling
19 that that message was making its way upstairs?

20 Mr. Phillips. I think it did so in the case of Viaux,
21 and Viaux was turned off. And it certainly made its way after
22 the death of Schneider, and there were only two days left
23 before election.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. It was a little late for
25 Schneider?

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

69

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. PHillips. It was a little late for Schneider.
2 Mr. Schwarz. Let's go back to Director Helms' summary
3 of the whole affair. And if you turn to pages 6 through 8 --
4 6 through 9, he is talking about efforts in connection with the
5 press. And without your having to read the whole thing, you
6 did try to improve propaganda in Chile, right?
7 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I did.
8 Mr. Schwarz. Through a number of devices?
9 Mr. Phillips. And worldwide.
10 Mr. Schwarz. And worldwide.
11 Now, the things that struck my eye is at page 8. And
12 I will read this to you, starting in the third line at page 8:
13 "A program of journalists -- actual agents and other-
14 wise -- travelling to Chile for on-the-scene reporting. (By
15 28 September, CIA had in place in, or enroute to, Chile 15
16 journalist agents from 10 different countries. This
17 cadre was supplemented by 8 more journalists from 5 countries
18 under the direction of high level agents who were, for the
19 most part, in managerial capacities in the media field.)"
20 Where the word agents is used in there, it means CIA
21 agents, I take it?
22 Mr. Phillips. It does not mean CIA officers.
23 Mr. Schwarz. But it means person --
24 Mr. Phillips. Intelligence personnel around the world
25 probably who are on our payroll not because we looked forward

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

70

1 to the date they were going to Chile, but because we wanted
2 to use them as agents of influence.

3 Maybe it was a newspaper columnist, because we knew
4 the president of that company read that column every morning.
5 So, they were taken advantage of.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Could you say to the Committee, not
7 now limiting your testimony to the subject of Chile, but speak-
8 ing generally from your knowledge and experience, the extent
9 to which CIA has first outside the U.S., and second, with res-
10 pect to U.S. personnel, such relationships with persons in
11 the media?

12 Mr. Phillips. My knowledge is now two months and three
13 weeks old. We had extensive relations with journalists,
14 with TV editorialists, with people who might be described as
15 Bernard Baruch sitting on a park bench, for the purpose of
16 what I call small ⁹ C, small A covert action.

17 In other words, the agent of influence. If you find a
18 friend that is able to help you make a statement that appears
19 to be an indigenous initiative rather than a U.S. one, these
20 people are useful.

21 It has declined considerably over the years. And it is
22 just in the hectic days of the fifties, the Cold War, and
23 then the sixties in Latin America, when Castro was very active
24 there, and that sort of thing, it was used a lot. It is much
25 less now.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 Mr. Schwarz. But it still exists?

2 Mr. Phillips. It still exists, but in a very attenuated

3 form.

4 The Chairman. These journalists or television commen-

5 tators who are enlisted by the CIA to make statements favor-

6 able to the U.S., or in support of American policy, they are

7 paid for this?

8 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir -- not in all cases.

9 The Chairman. Not in all cases, but commonly they are

10 paid for this?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 The Chairman. And in that sense they are acting as cover

13 agents of the CIA?

14 Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

15 Senator Huddleston. Could we get some idea of what

16 the fee might be for a prominent broadcaster who is a journal-

17 ist who would write or broadcast favorable stories?

18 Mr. Phillips. I would think it would range from

19 Honduras \$50 a month, to in a larger capital such as Buenos

20 Aires as high as \$400 or \$50^D. I guess the average would be

21 \$150 or something like that.

22 Senator Huddleston. Do you know of any instances where

23 we have that kind of agent in the U.S?

24 Mr. Phillips. I know of none, sir.

25 Mr. Schwarz. In your experience, however, you have

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

72

1 known of such persons within the U.S.?

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes. During the Bay of Pigs, for
3 instance, we supported a number of exiles who had publications
4 and that sort of thing.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Let's leave out sort of special publica-
6 tions and things like that and focus on larger areas.

7 The Chairman. What kind of publications, publications
8 that are circulating inside the U.S.?

9 Mr. Phillips. They were certainly circulating in Miami.
10 These were the exile groups. There was a doctors' group and a
11 womens' group and a youth group, and so forth. It was a part
12 of sort of keeping them functioning to have a house organ sort
13 of thing. They weren't major publications, but it was a part
14 of their program.

15 The Chairman. But they were publications of a domestic
16 character in the sense that they were printed and circulated
17 within the U.S., even though they may have been confined to
18 this Cuban group of exiles?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

20 But only incidentally, Senator. They were Spanish, I
21 think, all of them, and they were designed to be sent to other
22 Latin American countries, and that sort of thing. So,
23 obviously there was a spillover domestically, but that was not
24 the purpose of it.

25 Mr. Schwarz. What do you know other than that about

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

73

1 relationships between the CIA and media people connected with
2 the U.S. publications?

3 Mr. Phillips. To the extent that I am aware, there are no
4 such connections now.

5 Mr. Schwarz. What about the past?

6 Mr. Phillips. It was made quite obvious that that was
7 not to go. I have not personally known of a case where an
8 American journalist was on our payroll. There might very well
9 have been a number, but I wasn't concerned. What happened
10 frequently overseas was that the local U.S. journalist
11 sought out the CIA Station Chief, it was kind of a common
12 thing, just as they had contact with the political consular,,
13 and so forth.

14 The system that I always knew was, let's have lunch every
15 couple of weeks, and I will pick up the tab one day, and you
16 pick up the tab the next day.

17 So, I am sure there havebeen cases. But I am not
18 personally aware of journalists who have been on the payroll.

19 Mr. Schwarz. These foreign agents, if I can use a
20 colloquialism, must have been on pretty short notice, because
21 within a few days of deciding on the program of going to
22 Chile, 15 from 10 different countries~~and eight more~~ from
23 five other countries were on their way to Chile. And that
24 suggests at least strongly that there was an intimate relation-
25 ship where they responded readily and promptly to the CIA's

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
CONTRIBUTED BY THE ARK

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

74

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 direction.

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I would say that most of those people
3 were probably people on the payroll, and the fellow that
4 met them once a month to give them their \$150 said, look,
5 we would like you to go right to Chile. Yes, they were
6 controled agents, I would say.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Talking about U.S. publications, on pages
8 10 and 11 Mr. Helms makes the point that the CIA was able to
9 change around the cover story of Time Magazine.

10 Do you recall that incident?

11 Mr. Phillips. I haven't had a chance to really look
12 at this. I glanced at it. I do remember that there was, I
13 believe, a cover story in Time about Chile, and that there
14 was some contact, but I don't know who it was that made it.
15 But I do recall something of that kind.

16 Mr. Schwarz. And the effort of the contact was to make
17 the Time cover story to be more favorable to the propaganda
18 campaign that we were trying to run in connection with
19 Track II?

20 Mr. Phillips. I think that is safe to assume. I
21 don't know the circumstances under which that contact was
22 made. You do understand, sir, that a great many journalists
23 telephone the CIA building whenever there is something in the
24 news and say, can I come out and get a briefing? They seek
25 that. And I think this may have been one of those situations

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

75

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 where someone decided to take advantage of it. But I am
2 not aware of details.

3 Mr. Schwarz. We have been going through this memo
4 which Director Helms sent on to Mr. Kissinger.

5 Do you know who wrote the memo?

6 Mr. Phillips. I do not.

7 Mr. Schwarz. And you have never seen the memo before
8 today?

9 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. I may have, but I don't
10 recall it. I returned to Rio, of course, right after this
11 Track II period. And this I believe was written after that.
12 And if I saw it it was in a historical sense in a file, and
13 I probably just looked at it and flipped through. I don't
14 recall that I have seen it.

15 Mr. Schwarz. I would like now to have you turn to page
16 16. And we are now going to get back to the subject of
17 General Schneider. And we have gone through the fact that
18 you understood there was a need to remove him in some fashion
19 in order to accomplish objectives.

20 Here is what Mr. Helms says about the impact, the killing
21 of General Schneider had. This is at the end of paragraph d
22 on page 16:

23 "Yet, when a coup opportunity and situation presented
24 itself upon the assassination of Army Commander in Chief
25 Schneider, Frei moved quickly away from it".

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

76

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the
2 assassination of Schneider was something which presented the
3 opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have
4 done.

5 Do you agree with me?

6 Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am
7 not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will
8 tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when
9 the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finish.
10 Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred,
11 Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as
12 Marshall, immediately said, this is it, that is enough. There
13 was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the
14 moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is
15 it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America
16 that would have been the signal for further action, weakness,
17 and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the
18 business.

19 Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi-
20 ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group
21 and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one
22 of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that
25 one of the assignments that [redacted] had?

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

77

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. [REDACTED] Yes, I believe it was [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] that was in touch with that group.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem,
4 didn't they?

5 Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?

6 Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]

8 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have
9 been some central direction from the office or from headquar-
10 ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had
11 the slightest idea that [REDACTED] was working with us.
12 And I don't believe that [REDACTED] -- I don't know that
13 [REDACTED] knew about them.

14 So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of
15 direction from the Station.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in
17 Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela group and
18 the Viaux group?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here,
21 counsel?

22 Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interrupt-
23 tible.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we
25 chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

78

1 trying to get the date straightened out -- did the government,
2 namely, the President ^{lwl} of the National Security Council,
3 decide to institute Track II before September 16 when
4 apparently the alleged repression against the press and so
5 forth took place in Chile?

6 Mr. Phillips. Sir, not to my knowledge. My understand-
7 ing of it was, being in Rio, being summoned by a cable, and
8 I didn't know why, arriving around the 18th or 19th, people
9 said, the other day we got word that we should do Track II.
10 So, my understanding was that it was something that just
11 bam, happened, and it was not developed over a period of
12 weeks or months.

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. If my recollection of the
14 dates is correct, however, the President was meeting or was
15 making this decision about the same day that the briefing
16 book, some of the information in the briefing book suggests
17 Allende had begun to institute a program of repression against
18 the press and labor unions, and so forth, or other groups,
19 is that correct?

20 Somebody tell me if I am wrong here. I am trying to
21 see the degree to which the White House, the President, was
22 reacting to some events in Chile, or whether he had already
23 made up his mind before those events occurred.

24 The Chairman. Can somebody give Senator Hart some
25 help?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
COMMITTEE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

79

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Trevorton. The date of the meeting with the President was September 15. All this occurred during the period 2 while Frei was still officially President of Chile, prior 3 to Allende's taking office.

5 Senator Hart of Colorado. There is the suggestion that 6 Allende announced a program of shutting down the free press, 7 and so forth, within hours of the meeting.

8 I am trying to figure out whether the President was 9 aware of Allende's intentions before his decision to insti- 10 tute Track II, or whether he had already decided to do that prior 11 to any announced intentions of Allende's about dismantling 12 democracy in Chile. I think it is fairly important as 13 to what was going on in his mind.

14 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I don't know.

15 Senator Hart of Colorado. This is more to try to get 16 the record straight. Is this crucial? I think it is crucial.

17 The Chairman. The record shows that democracy was not 18 wholly strangled even at the time that Allende himself was 19 assassinated and the military coup took over.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. I understand. But if we, 21 for example, had the former President of the U. S. here, 22 and he said, well, we heard the day before that Allende had 23 stated his intentions to put censorship on the press and pro- 24 hibited free meetings, and so on, I am just trying to establish 25 in fact if it occurred the other way around.

I think it did. I think he made his decisions before

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCLASSIFIED

1 Allende made these statements.

2 The Chairman. What was the date that the President
3 gave Helms the direct order to prevent Allende from coming to
4 power? I think all of this happened prior to the time that
5 Allende even assumed the presidency.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. It did.

7 The Chairman. Before he had any opportunity to take any
8 action against anyone.

9 Senator Hart of Colorado. There is no question about
10 it, but it is apparent from some of the information in this
11 book that he had announced in about mid-September, about
12 the 16th or 17th, that he had intended to begin to shut down
13 on the press and some other public meetings and things
14 like that. I am going to find a piece of paper.

15 Mr. Schwarz. You will find some of this in this long
16 Helms document, page 6, I think, Senator.

17 Senator Hart of Colorado. That is it, this memo we
18 just got, --

19 Mr. Schwarz. Page 6: "By 15 September, it became
20 apparent that Allende was conducting a rather blatant campaign
21 to intimidate the Chilean information media through threats
22 of assassination and violence,"

23 Senator Hart of Colorado. My guess is, did the President
24 know that, and could he have used that as justification for
25 his statement to Helms when he made his decision.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

81

1 Mr. Schwarz. Can you cast light on that, Mr. Phillips.

2 Mr. Phillips. I am trying to remember one public state-
3 ment by Allende. He made a speech in which he referred to
4 some sort of axis, the socialist world now has the Soviet
5 Union, Havana, and we will be the third point on the axis.
6 He may have made that considerably after this time, I don't
7 know. That is the sort of thing that the President might have
8 noticed. And I don't think there is any question that
9 reports from the Embassy, intelligence reports, and political
10 reporting, did indicate the intention to form a Marxist
11 government.

12 And the only other thing that might be useful is that
13 it is my belief that what happened was that the elections
14 took place, the first Marxist in history was elected, and
15 that policy-makers, or perhaps the President, were sort of
16 caught by surprise, what has happened here, why didn't some-
17 one tell me this was going to happen.

18 And that is when he really started thinking about it.

19 The Chairman. And you previously testified, did you
20 not, that from your knowledge that Allende attempted to
21 achieve a socialist system, or a Marxist system, through
22 constitutional means?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

24 The Chairman. And even a year or more after he became
25 President elections were still taking place in the country?

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

82

1 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.
2 To amplify, that, however, Senator, I think in these
3 early days we are talking about that was not apparent
4 that it was the case. It later became apparent, and it is
5 true that there were things happening in the early days, such
6 as orders going to the printers of childrens school books,
7 you will now not print such and such a book, you will print
8 this version. And it was after he had been in that it became
9 apparent what really his problems were because he was
10 doing it within what he saw as the constitutional framework.

11 The Chairman. And you also testified, did you not,
12 that Castro was reported to have told him that he couldn't pull
13 it off that way, and that he should substitute totalitarian
14 methods to insure the success of his revolution.

15 Mr. Phillips. As I recall the report, it was something
16 like, if you want this revolution to work, you will -- you
17 are going to have to spill blood to do so.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Could you show the witness, at Tab 4
19 of the book there is a memorandum from Dianne LaVoy which
20 contains quotations from the so-called Chile task force log.
21 And I would like to turn to page 8. I can represent to you,
22 Mr. Phillips, that this is a quotation taken by our staff
23 from the task force log, and you prepared the task force log
24 for Mr. Karamessines.

25 Mr. Phillips. Other people prepared it and he supervised

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

83

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 the preparation.

2 Mr. Schwarz. And this was intended to be an accurate
3 representation of the important events of the day after
4 it was sent to Mr. Karamessines?

5 Mr. Phillips. Yes. It was to keep him up to date
6 on what was happening.

7 Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you this in the light of your
8 testimony that immediately following General Schneider's abduc-
9 tion and wounding you said, it is over, the group decided
10 things were over. And I will read to you the quotation for
11 October 23, and then the one for October 28.

12 The 23rd: "The attack on General Schneider has produced
13 developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan".

14 That is true, isn't it?

15 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. And it was Valenzuela's plan that we
17 thought was the most likely to succeed, right?

18 I recognize you didn't think any of them were too good,
19 but that was the best one?

20 Mr. Phillips. I don't think it closely followed
21 Valenzuela's plan in the sense that the plan was to kidnap, in
22 which case the military might very well have moved. But it
23 didn't closely follow it, since he died.

24 Mr. Schwarz. The statement is that the attack on
25 Schneider produced certain developments. Let's see what the

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

84

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAYL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 developments were:

2 "Schneider has been removed. A state of emergency has
3 been declared. General Pratts has replaced GEneral Schneider.
4 Radicals have been arrested, and General Valenzuela has assumed
5 control of Santiago province. Consequently the plotters'
6 positions have been enhanced.

7 Now, on October 28 -- let's just stop there. That shows,
8 does it not, that your contemporaneous reaction was that the
9 plotters with whom we were dealing and whom we hoped would
10 be successful were in an enhanced position, not worse position?

11 Mr. Phillips. In a purely mechanical sense, that is
12 true.

13 Mr. Schwarz. What doyou mean by a purely mechanical
14 sense?

15 Mr. Phillips. In the sense that certain developments
16 had occurred. What I was referring to in our suggestions
17 was that those developments having occurred within the
18 context of the death of Schneider, and given the Chilean
19 character, the very fact that they had reached that position
20 and had obtained objectives really meant nothing, because no
21 one was really going to do anything. I honestly don't believe
22 that after his death there was any serious planning on the
23 part of anyone as to going ahead.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Then reading the Octiber 28 entry: "It
25 now appears that the military principles with whom we were in

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

85

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 contact" -- by that you mean the Valenzuela group principally,
2 don't you?

3 Mr. Phillips. I would presume so, yes.

4 Mr. Schwarz. "-- depended on the abduction of
5 General Schneider probably by General Viaux as the pretext
6 needed to launch a coup".

7 Is that accurate?

8 Mr. Phillips. I see that this is in quote. I simply
9 can't remember --

10 Mr. Schwarz. I am not asking you, is it an accurate
11 quote, but is it not an accurate representation of the situa-
12 tion?

13 Mr. Phillips. It now appears it was someone's opinion
14 based on perhaps a document or someone else.

15 Mr. Schwarz. It wasn't just someone's opinion, it
16 was what you sent on to Mr. Karamessines in your function of
17 giving him the best information that you had at the time.

18 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

19 Senator Mondale. Counsel, you keep referring to whether
20 they are separate.

21 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to explore whether they were
22 separate.

23 Doesn't it appear from the October 28 General Viaux
24 was one person and General Valenzuela was another person, they
25 both had in mind the same tactics, and that is, kidnapping

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

86

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 General Schneider, right?

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And second, the October 28 entry suggests
4 that the Valenzuela group intended to use the Viaux group
5 to accomplish the objective which they sought to accomplish,
6 isn't that right?

7 Mr. Phillips. Yes. I think in the sense of looking
8 back it says, it now appears.

9 In answering that question, it is incredible the degree
10 to which Latins talked about plans. And you would think when
11 they have a coup that four or five would get together. But
12 there is a great deal of talk, and there is always some sort
13 of cross fertilization. I think an accurate characterization
14 of the situation was that we saw the Viaux group as a separ-
15 ate and distinc^te one, the Valenzuela group as a completely
16 difffferent one, but we recognized that the second cousin of
17 one fellow got on the phone and talked to the other, and they
18 had some knowledge of what the plans were. General Viaux was
19 a well-known figure after the popular uprising, and so forth.

20 I think this probably represents the recognition that
21 these fellows we have been dealing with ultimately have also
22 been talking with Viaux with whom ew dealt previously,
23 yes.

24 Mr. Schwarz. It was more than just talking. Your
25 best opinion after the event was that the Valenzuela group

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

87

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 depended on action by General Viaux?

2 Mr. Phillips. To the extent that this document was
3 written by others, and authorized by me, it would not neces-
4 sarily represent my best opinion.

5 On the morning of October 23 I was quite tired.

6 Mr. Schwarz. This is October 28.

7 Mr. Phillips. Well, after the shooting of Schneider I
8 was not my usual self. So, I don't want to say that that is
9 my best opinion. That is something that someone wrote and that
10 I approved. And it is basically true, it now appears that,
11 yes.

12 Mr. Schwarz. That was known before the shooting, the
13 abduction and ultimate shooting of General Schneider, too,
14 wasn't it? You remember the plot which was to take place on
15 the evening of the 19th of October where General Schneider
16 was to be abducted from a party.

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And you knew then, the CIA and I guess
19 you personally knew then, that in that case as well General
20 Valenzuela and General Viaux were acting cooperatively to
21 accomplish their common objective?

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that we knew it with any
23 certainty.

24 Mr. Schwarz. But that was the report you had, wasn't it?

25 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall precisely. Generally

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FISKE
FOUNDATION
COMMITTEE THE AMERICAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

88

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 speaking, we saw them as two separate groups, and we didn't
2 see the Valenzuela group as an opportunity through which to
3 further utilize the Viaux group, because we had made the
4 decision sometime before to cut contact with him. I think
5 that is a fair general statement.

6 This is not to say that we would have turned off the
7 Valenzuela group if they had said, look, General Viaux is
8 going to move, and so forth, what happens in that situation.

9 Mr. Schwarz. You keep saying cut off contact with the
10 Viaux group. You didn't really do that, did you?

11 Mr. Phillips. No. But we abandoned the idea that
12 General Viaux was going to carry off a coup, we thought he
13 wouldn't do it, the odds were too high against it.

14 We made a conscious decision.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Is this a fair summary?

16 First, on the contact, you continued an alternative
17 channel of contact with General Viaux after he said to you,
18 look, your plans don't look like the best, is that fair?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, we did.

20 Mr. Schwarz. And you continued to know that General
21 Viaux and General Valenzuela were working together?

22 Mr. Phillips. To some degree, yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. And after the event you authorized, five
24 days after the event you authorized in a memorandum to Mr.
25 Karamessines: the statement that General Viaux was really the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

89

1 instrument of General Valenzuela?

2 Mr. Phillips. It is certainly there, that statement.

3 I am not sure that I agree that it should be assumed from
4 that that we took quite such a firm stand on it.

5 And as far as continuing the contact with General
6 Viaux' group, that would have been done just as a professional
7 tactic if you are dealing with a group and asking them to do
8 some rather unusual thing. And you say to them, we have
9 decided that you are not going to be successful, and we don't
10 want you to go ahead, you don't slam the door and go away
11 because you are afraid they will be unhappy for you and take
12 the local equivalent of writing their Congressman. And so
13 it is a tactic of, let's let them down easily and let them be
14 friends and don't let them think that we have cut them off,
15 or they will do something crazy, or something that they shouldn't
16 or reveal the fact that we were in touch.

17 So, that was a tactic as well as anything else.

18 Mr. Schwarz. In both the Viaux plan and the Valen-
19 zuela plan you didn't believe that the generals themselves
20 were going to go up and stick a gun in Schneider's belly,
21 did you?

22 Mr. Phillips. No, we did not.

23 Mr. Schwarz. They were going to employ someone to do
24 it?

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

90

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. And in both cases they wanted from the
2 Agency money for that purpose, to help employ the people.

3 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that General Viaux
4 asked for any money. Valenzuela, I believe, wanted \$50,000,
5 yes, which was not passed to him.

6 Mr. Schwarz. It wasn't passed to him, it was offered
7 to him, and it wasn't passed to him because the scheme of
8 October 19 didn't come off, isn't that right?

9 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. It wasn't that you had any reluctance
11 to give him the money, if he succeeded in abducting Schneider
12 he got the money?

13 Mr. Phillips. That is right. It was authorized but
14 not spent.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you helped pay for General Viaux'
16 legal expenses after he was arrested, didn't you?

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes, we did.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And let's turn again to what Director
19 Helms thought the situation was as of either the 18th of
20 November memo or the December as he sent it on to Mr. Kissinger
21 as a description of what had happened. Look at page 22.
22 Here is what he says about who accomplished the abduction and
23 caused the killing, from the bottom of the page:

24 "Their rationale is not certain at this stage, nor,
25 for that matter, is it certain who or what group was ultimately

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

91

1 responsible for Schneider's assassination."

2 That was your state of mind after the event, wasn't it?

3 Mr. Phillips. Yes. We didn't quite know what had
4 happened, we didn't have the details. We didn't know who it
5 was.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Is it a fair statement, Mr. Phillips, that
7 as far as the Valenzuela and Viaux groups and the question of
8 their separability, on the one hand you had different persons
9 in touch with the two groups.

10 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And moreover, at some point the person who
12 was in touch with the Viaux group indicated to General Viaux
13 that we didn't think his plan was terribly practical?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand, Generals Viaux and
16 Valenzuela had the same objective?

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

18 Mr. Schwarz. The same tactic?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

20 Mr. Schwarz. The abduction of General Schneider.
21 They had acted in cooperation in connection with the incident
22 on the 19th.

23 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that, it is very possible.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And as we have gone through before, you
25 indicated that after the event that it now appears that the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED 92

1 Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one
2 of the Valenzuela group's plan?

3 Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically.
4 Obviously when the guns were passed [REDACTED]
5 and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we
6 thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we
7 read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-
8 gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could
9 really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly
10 the Valenzuela group using those guns.

11 Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had
12 been furnished earlier? Wasn't there evidence that there
13 were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to
14 abduct General Schneider?

15 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. There may very well have
16 been, but I am not real sure about that.

17 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which
18 is the relationship [REDACTED] If there are any
19 questions on the relationship between the two groups.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19
21 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum
22 by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable
23 A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of
24 these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with
25 [REDACTED] and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

93

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WAND A. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 carried out on October 19. [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED] witting of the above plan, has promised to keep
3 the Carabineros away from the Schneier house to assure that the
4 abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is
5 knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly
6 involved."

7 What do you think "not directly involved" refers to?

8 Why not just not involved?

9 Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what
10 I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very
11 unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin
12 that works with some group type of thing.

13 And I believe that it must refer to that.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual
15 cable in the Senator's books?

16 Mr. Inderfurther. No.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that para-
18 graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19
19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

20 "General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not
21 directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with
22 prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19
23 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is
24 not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of
25 week."

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

94

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Now, I can't read that language any way other than
2 meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in
3 close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it
4 was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would
5 be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved.
6 And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there
7 was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

8 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that
9 way.

10 Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more
11 than just the statement?

12 Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

13 Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --

14 Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was [REDACTED]

15 Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

16 Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an ex-
17 hibit.

18 (The document referred to was
19 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2
20 for identification.)

21
22
23

24
25

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

95

1 Senator Hart of Michigan. (now presiding) Mr. Schwarz,
2 I think you planned to take up this matter of the CIA
3 relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is not
4 quite 12:15. The members on this side, I believe, are
5 scheduled for a luncheon of the Democratic Conference which
6 would require our absence. In the members on the other side
7 are free to continue, I am sure it would accommodate the
8 witness. But for those on this side, I think we will have to
9 leave. And there is a vote on.

10 Senator Schweiker. Come back when?

11 Senator Hart of Michigan. After the vote.

12 Senator Schweiker. When is your conference over?

13 Senator Hart of Michigan. 1:30, 2:00 o'clock.

14 Senator Schweiker. I can come back after the vote for
15 a little while, but if you want to recess it until then, it is
16 okay.

17 Senator Hart of Michigan. Counsel suggests that we will
18 recess now until 2:15.

19 (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., a recess was taken until
20 2:15 p.m. of the same day.)

21 - - -

22

23

24

25

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

96

UNCLASSIFIED

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:35 p.m.

3 Senator Schweiker. (now presiding) Counsel has suggested
4 that we get started to expedite the proceedings, and also to
5 let counsel go ahead with some of the questions that they
6 still have before them from other sessions.

7 Before he does, Mr. Phillips, I would just like to ask
8 a couple of questions myself.

9 I know you are aware, Mr. Phillips, that you are still
10 under oath from this morning's session.

11 How much are you aware of Mr. Edwards, the owner of the
12 paper, in Chile? Are you aware or acquainted with him at
13 all, the publisher?

14 TESTIMONY OF DAVID A. PHILLIPS -- continued

15 Mr. Phillips. I met him two or three times, Mr. Chair-
16 man. I knew his older sister Sonya quite well, and his father.
17 Since I was in the newspaper business in Santiago, I knew
18 ^{Augustin} Augustine Edwards, Senior, and many of the senior people in
19 that newspaper.

20 Senator Schweiker. And can you briefly describe the
21 role that that paper played in the country, just for back-
22 ground purposes?

23 Mr. Phillips. I suppose you would call it the
24 New York Times of the country. It was certainly the leading
25 paper of the country, an institution. It represented the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

97

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 establishment more than anything else, but I think probably in
2 a fairly serious way, and with a great deal of influence..

3 Senator Schweiker. And the publisher, Mr. Edwards,
4 was he an American citizen?

5 Mr. Phillips. No, sir, he was a Chilean.

6 Senator Schweiker. But he had some American origins,
7 did he not?

8 Mr. Phillips. I believe it was British.

9 Senator Schweiker. Now, are you familiar with infor-
10 mation that the Committee has as to what prompted President
11 Nixon to ask for the overthrow of the Allende government
12 in a series of meetings?

13 Mr. Phillips. No, sir, I don't think I am.

14 Senator Schweiker. The information that has come to
15 the Committee's attention is that there was a meeting
16 between Mr. Edwards and Mr. Kendall of the Pepsi Cola Company
17 in which Mr. Edwards briefed Mr. Kendall on the situation down
18 there, and I guess requested help in some way or some form,
19 and then Mr. Kendall went to President Nixon and in essence
20 did the same thing.

21 And from the records that we have, if they are complete,
22 it would appear that that really triggered the order to the
23 CIA to go ahead and overthrow the government. Were you familiar
24 with that at all?

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir, I was generally familiar with that

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

98

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 pattern. I didn't realize that it was such a specific cause,
2 but I was aware of the fact that Mr. Kendall was a friend
3 of Augustine Edwards, Junior, and I had heard about those
4 meetings, and so forth.

5 Senator Schweiker. If this sequence of events is
6 basically correct, as we have been given to believe they are,
7 and if the facts as I stated them, oversimplified, of course,
8 are true, it does concern me that basically what has happened
9 here is an interest in a foreign government that came to one
10 of our own people, who then went to the President, and that
11 really triggered the decision to have a coup with Allende.

12 And it strikes me that this is just about the worst way
13 not only to have a foreign policy, but to decide that a govern-
14 ment has to be overthrown. And I guess it gets back to what
15 we were talking about this morning, when do you say no
16 and when do you say yes.

17 But do you feel that is a justification for overthrowing
18 a government, that kind of a threat of suggestion and action?
19 What is your concept of how we ought to decide -- if in fact
20 we should, as you have, I think, articulately argued -- that
21 there are occasions when government intervention is justified?

22 It would just seem to me, from the facts that we
23 have, that this is one where it isn't. Maybe I am interpreting
24 events incorrectly.

25 Mr. Phillips. Sir, that is my understanding. When I

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

99

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 said that I didn't realize that was a specific reason, it
2 would be a surprise to me if it really turned out that that
3 was the reason. Because of some of the other factors that he
4 enumerated today, there were a good many people in the U.S.
5 government, not just the President, but in the State Depart-
6 ment and the CIA and the Defense establishment, that were
7 quite concerned about the drift toward the left in Chile.

8 It really didn't have very much to do with a single news-
9 paper such as it would be in this indication.

10 And so in answer to the first part of your question, no,
11 I think it is a bad way to do things. But in the Chile
12 thing my guess would have been that there was a lot more to
13 it just than this one visit.

14 Senator Schweiker. Except for two things, Mr. Phillips.

15 Number one, we know for a fact and as a matter of record
16 that recommendations didn't flow from the bottom up, that the
17 normal policy procedures weren't operating, that the CIA or the
18 State Department didn't recommend to the Committee of Forty,
19 for example, that we ought to stop Allende from getting power.
20 That would be the normal way that this authorization would
21 have flown, is that not true?

22 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

23 Senator Schweiker. And we also know as a matter of fact
24 that the order bypassed, that in coming from the top down,
25 instead of flowing from the bottom up, it bypassed the normal

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

100

1 channels of communications besides, it went directly from Pre-
2 sident Nixon to the CIA Director, is that not correct?

3 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

4 Senator Schweiker. So that both of these facts, you
5 see, indicate that it was an abnormal procedure, it was an
6 abnormal decision making process. And I would judge that it
7 would lend quite a bit of credence to the fact that the sequence
8 of how we tried to topple Allende did occur in the way that the
9 information we received would indicate.

10 And that is what makes me disturbed, because if it had
11 happened the other way, while I wouldn't ^{half} felt that we
12 should have intervened, or attempted to overthrow the govern-
13 ment, I would have felt that at least the governmental processes
14 were working, maybe they were working erroneously, but at
15 least they were working.

16 But here they weren't working at all, it seems.

17 Mr. Phillips. I certainly don't dispute that, sir.
18 I don't have the facts of these meetings you are talking about,
19 of course. So, I can't say why Mr. Nixon decided to do this.
20 What I did want to say is that I would be surprised if the
21 very fact that Mr. Nixon was an anti-Communist didn't play a
22 role in his decision. I think that he probably saw the develop-
23 ments in Cuba as a threat from the left, along with other
24 things.

25 But as I say, I am speculating, I really can't say.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

101

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PHIL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 As for the narrow part of your question, by all means
2 it is a bad way to do business.

3 Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line
5 of questioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu-
6 ment Tab A.

7 It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17
8 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep-
9 tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

10 Incidentally, what was the code name for this project?

11 Was it [REDACTED]

12 Mr. Phillips. [REDACTED], one of the two.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Does [REDACTED] stnd for anything in particular?

14 Mr. Phillips. [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]

18 Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of
19 these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these
20 names?

21 Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have
22 a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated.

23 And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes
24 out in those things.

25 Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

102

1 it pixie-like.

2 Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonyms mean ab-
3 solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

4 Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

5 Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

6 Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good
7 ones.

8 Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that
9 document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2
10 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

11 "The Agency is to carry out this mission without
12 coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

15 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in
17 Chile a man called REDACTED

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

20 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed
22 to take his instructions only from the CIA in Chile, is that
23 right?

24 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

103

1 his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the
2 defense attache system down there?

3 Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

4 Mr. Schwarz. [REDACTED] was the man from [REDACTED] and then
5 there was someone else [REDACTED] and there
6 was a boss?

7 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

8 Mr. Schwarz. And [REDACTED] was told not to tell that boss?

9 Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that [REDACTED]
11 came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

12 Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was
13 the fact that [REDACTED] had been around Latin America,
14 spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he
15 developed really marvelous relationships with the military of
16 officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just
17 that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the
18 task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take
19 advantage of [REDACTED] that they liked the most.
20 trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural
21 for him to spend his weekends with these people.

22 Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset.
23 But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and
24 lay that question against the instruction from President
25 Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

104

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 you accomplish it?

2 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory
3 refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know
4 that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book
5 that has been signed by General Philpott which was a message
6 to [REDACTED] saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process
7 was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott,
8 I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott?

10 Mr. Phillips. I never did.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

12 Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large
13 meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any
14 meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior
15 to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr.
16 Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been
17 left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

19 Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

20 Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Phil-
21 pott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this
23 entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our build-
24 ing. I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do
25 that sort of thing.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~100-SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

105

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Obviously it is possible that one of these gentlemen
2 could have called me on the phone and left a message, or I talked
3 to them and forgot them. But I certainly don't recall such a
4 thing.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as Exhibit 3 a document which
6 is at Tab D of the book.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 3 for identification (Phillips))

Preference COPY: IEEE Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 Elliott Street, Seattle, Washington. D. C. 208893

1 Obviously it is possible that one of these gentlemen
2 could have called me on the phone and left a message, or I talked
3 to them and forgot them. But I certainly don't recall such a
4 thing.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as Exhibit 3 a document which
6 is at Tab D of the book.

7 (The document referred to was
8 marked Exhibit No. 3 for iden-
9 tification (Phillips))

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

REF ID: A6274

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

106

29900 (Area 292) 544-6000

Mr. Schwarz. Is that the document that you say someone handed to you?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Who handed it to you?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. I would guess that it was probably Bill Broe that walked into the office where I worked and handed it to me. It may have just come through the mail as we saw it. I don't recall.

9 I do recall that there it was, it was something to be
10 sent down right away, and I sent it and just added the headings
11 on it, in other words, put quotes around what was there and
12 sent it on. I don't recall how it got to them.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as Exhibit 4 the docu-
14 ment at Tab E?

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WABO & PAUL

110 Elmer Street SE Wash. D.C. 20003

23

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

107

1 Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the
2 message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

3 Mr. Phillips. It is.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you
5 drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and
6 then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

7 Did you make that change?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said
9 Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said
10 Bennett. I think the signature on the original document
11 was from Philpott. But that is my change there.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page --
13 the sentence reads:

14 "Do not allow REDACTED to retain copy of this
15 message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that
16 General Bennett is out of the country".

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what
19 do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make
20 those changes?

21 Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one
22 of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed
23 something that is written out, and there is no secretary.
24 and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that.
25 On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

108

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 the communicators to send that, and you will then later write
2 for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable.
3 I am not sure about that.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Ben-
5 nett's name and not General Philpott's name?

6 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had
7 been the case that not only would the change have been made,
8 but there would have been some sort of note on the side or
9 something. So, I believe that the original must have said
10 Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

11 Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the
12 first page used Bennett's name, right?

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had
15 previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the
16 "suggested message to be sent" from General
17 Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that
18 purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that
19 before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used
20 Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennett's.

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

22 Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed
23 message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3
24 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

25 Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1 have certainly not have typed this message without having
2 even this document first.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Then why did you put Bennett's name in
4 when you typed it? That is what I am puzzled about.

5 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. And I didn't put in either
6 Philpott's name or Bennett's name, because as I recall this,
7 I was handed something, and said, send this. Someone else
8 had been out talking with these people and said, send this,
9 and I just put the heading on, to Santiago, and the end of it.

10 Mr. Schwarz. So it appears that the person who handed
11 you the thing expected to put in Bennett's name? I don't
12 understand.

13 Let me explain to you, Mr. Phillips, why we are making
14 such an inquiry into this matter.

15 We have spoken to General Bennett. And there are
16 going to be later cables that use his name. And he says he
17 never heard any such thing, never heard of any such operation.

18 Mr. Phillips. This is General Bennett?

19 Mr. Schwarz. General Bennett. That a search of his record
20 do not produce any documents related to this matter. And he
21 denies having had any connection whatsoever with it.

22 That is why we are trying to explore this in some de-
23 tail. So keep that in mind as we go along.

24 Did anybody ever tell you that General Bennett had any-
25 thing to do with the Track II matter?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ¹¹⁰

1 Mr. Phillips. No.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Or anything to do with the Chile matter at
3 all?

4 Mr. Phillips. No.

5 As a matter of fact, I think, as I recall it, they
6 wanted to get authority from this, someone is going to talk
7 to Bennett. The next I heard they didn't talk to Bennett,
8 he wasn't there, they talked to Philpott.

9 So, Philpott was talking, and consequently the message
10 went that way. Why it was typed in Bennet's the first time
11 I don't know. It could have been that someone thought they
12 were going to go talk to Bennett, and found out that he was
13 out of town or something, I just don't know on this point.
14 I just wasn't paying a great deal of attention to it because
15 it wasn't conducted by people outside of the little office
16 I was working in.

17 Mr. Schwarz. What is your best recollection, if you
18 have one, about who those persons were that were conducting
19 whatever was being conducted with either Philpott or Bennett.

20 Mr. Phillips. I do not recall who it was. It would
21 most likely have been Mr. Broe or Mr. Karamessines, or if it
22 were outside the building, someone that they have designated
23 in a sort of protocol fashion called up and said, I am
24 sending someone over to talk to you. But I don't know who
25 went over. I am not sure that I ever knew who did. I just

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

111

1 wasn't aware of this.

2 Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving
3 the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct [REDACTED] to
4 work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence
5 Agency further brought into the operation which we have been
6 calling Track II?

7 Mr. Phillips. My answer to that until a few minutes
8 ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document
9 since then that indicates that someone else was talked to
10 later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never
11 knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message. But
12 until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have
13 said, I think that Philpott was the man.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on
15 that one occasion?

16 Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion.
17 But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little
18 room with windows, and so there were other people doing other
19 things.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

21 Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

22 (The document referred to was
23 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5
24 for identification.)

25 ~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

112

1 Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer William
2 Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated Octo-
3 ber 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA.
4 And it says:

5 "Please deliver the following message ('destroy immedi-
6 ately') [REDACTED] eyes only from Lieutenant General
7 Bennett. "

8 Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message
9 which purports to be [REDACTED] from Lieutenant General
10 Bennett?

11 Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because
12 I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again
13 there was a document that was handed to me and I was told,
14 send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there,
15 and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I
16 authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on.
17 If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document
18 that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on
19 the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority
20 to authenticate, and I didn't necessarily turn to them and say,
21 hey --

22 Mr Schwarz. Prove that --

23 Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with
24 General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated docu-

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

113

1 ment headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] "Eyes only".

3 (The document referred to was
4 Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6
5 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FLEMING
FOUNDATION
THEATER

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ALL SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

114

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett

2 [REDACTED] and has the text in it which you sent on

3 [REDACTED]

4 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

5 Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to
6 who handed you that document?

7 Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that.

8 There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the
9 office and say, here is something to send. There were others
10 which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow
11 forwarding slip on it. There are times, I am sure, when I
12 would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the
13 way, send this.

14 I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which some-
15 one handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying
16 less attention to those things, because I was in effect the
17 postman for people doing other things.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all
19 about this document?

20 Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on
22 that document?

23 Mr. Phillips. Well, it certainly looks like the sig-
24 nature which was on the other document which was said to be
25 Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

~~ALL SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

115

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. It is not Bennett anyway, is it?

2 Mr. Phillips. Definitely not.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Those letters aren't Bennett's?

4 Mr. Phillips. No.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the document is not dated either,
6 is it?

7 Mr. Phillips. However, the cable that went out on
8 the 14th of October, there is a note on the bottom saying,
9 sent on the 14th of October. And the way those things were
10 going in those days, I am sure they wouldn't be held for
11 very long. So, it probably was the 14th of October, or
12 certainly shortly after.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you a question of characteriza-
14 tion, focusing on Exhibit 6.

15 First, it is not dated, except to the extent it says
16 it was sent on the 14th, but the document itself isn't date.

17 It says:

18 "Destroy immediately". It purports in type to be from
19 Lieutenant General Bennett, but yet purports to have a hand-
20 written signature of what looks to be Philpott.

21 Now, based on all these things, would you agree with
22 me that on the face of it is a rather peculiar document?

23 Mr. Phillips. It is certainly an interesting document.
24 In government it is true that many times there will be
25 something prepared for the signature of a senior person from

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

116

1 the Chief WH, and so forth, and other people will sign off on
2 that document.

3 Routine communications are almost completely that way.
4 The dispatches that go out to the field of 20 countries from
5 Latin America come from Chief, WH, or did at that time. The
6 Chief, WH would only see one out of 30, because they would be
7 on matters that weren't of great import. So, the very fact
8 that they use as a title a certain thing and someone else signs
9 it is not necessarily out of line.

10 This is of considerable import, however, and one would
11 think --

12 Mr. Schwarz. It is a little surprising that it is not
13 dated on its face, too, isn't it?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes, most government documents are
15 dated.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Particularly ones that are important.

17 Mr. Phillips. As you see in the writing which I put
18 on the bottom, I wrote on there the date on which I sent it
19 out.

20 Mr. Schwarz. But before you wrote on it it wasn't dated,
21 and as an important document, particularly one from the
22 military, they tend to be kind of precise, don't they,
23 in your experience?

24 Mr. Phillips. Generally speaking, that is true.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And particularly with them, and in general

UNCLASSIFIED

117

1 with documents that are important, one expects to see dates
2 on them, doesn't one?

3 Mr. Phillips. Generally speaking, one does, or
4 usually does.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark as Exhibit 7 the cable dated
6 14 October, the same day, a second cable to Santiago signed by
7 yourself as authenticating officer.

8 (The document referred to was
9 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 7
10 for identification.)

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

118

1 Mr. Schwarz. Who was the releasing officer here?

2 There is a blank out.

3 Mr. Phillips. I have written that, and I have
4 written "For". My handwriting is very difficult, but that
5 means "For". In other words, I released it for Broe,
6 or for someone else, and I presume it must be Broe there.

7 Mr. Schwarz. So as to this telegram which we have
8 now marked as Exhibit 7 you were both the authenticating
9 officer and the de facto releasing officer?

10 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, you are talking in the telegram,
12 which is Exhibit 7, about the telegram which was in Exhibit 5,
13 right?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you are explaining to the CIA
16 Station Chief in Santiago that something is going to be confus-
17 ing about the first telegram.

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Without yet getting into the words that
20 are in here, would you explain to the Committee what the
21 problem was? What was the confusion?

22 Mr. Phillips. Both Generals Bennett and Philpott have
23 been briefed by Chief, WHD. That would have been Mr. Broe.

24 The only answer I can have for you is the possibility
25 that someone went to Philpott and said, we want to use the

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

119

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

WARD & PAUL

1 [REDACTED] And those instructions went down. Apparently
2 it would appear that there might be something here where they
3 are going to bring in more people, as is known to several per-
4 sons, it says down here.

5 And it may have been because there was an attempt there
6 not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk
7 to you about something we are doing that we have kind of
8 already done. That is the only thing I can come up with. I
9 can't give you a better explanation than that.

10 Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling
11 and strange document?

12 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be
13 more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things
14 were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings
15 on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't
16 paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

17 Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with
18 some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place
19 you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating
20 officer.

21 And second, this is not simply taking some other message
22 and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive
23 document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station
24 Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

25 Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

120

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when
2 you have further testimony on this to help me jog my memory.
3 I can't remember the rationale for this.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that
5 are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

6 Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will
7 confuse [redacted].

8 It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would
9 have confused him.

10 "Background for his information: both Generals Bennett
11 and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

12 Who told you that?

13 Mr. Phillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume
14 this must have been Bill Broe.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling
16 you that?

17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I --
18 I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that
19 Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words,
20 that is the kind of cable that I wouldn't have released
21 just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing.
22 This cable I think must have originated either with a dis-
23 cussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word,
24 write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say,
25 do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1 here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone
2 else that was working in my shop, [REDACTED] or someone
3 else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing some-
4 thing else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said,
5 here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things.
6 So I really can't remember.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe
8 spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff
9 spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes
10 out?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

13 Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable
14 went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at
15 night.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

17 Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

18 Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has
19 a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

20 Mr. Phillips. Right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

23 The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were
24 leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and
25 he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

121

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

122

1 have said, fellows, I have got to go to the Director's house
2 for dinner, get that cable out. And, therefore, he would have
3 been there physically to sign it. That is often the reason for
4 someone else signing it.

5 Senator Schweiker. Particularly if it is at 11:59.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Does that 11:59 reflect a time? (Showing
7 document to the witness).

8 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. Isn't that a telephone
9 exchange?

10 Mr. Quanbeck. I notice right in the center that it is
11 Zulu time, 12:20 Zulu, which would be eight o'clock in London,
12 and track six or seven hours here, or probably two o'clock or
13 one o'clock in the afternoon.

14 Mr. Schwarz. That statement by Mr. Quanbeck refers to
15 an entry under date and time file.

16 Do you agree with his construction of those numbers
17 there?

18 Mr. Phillips. I do. Because that tells you when the
19 message was sent. So one reason could have been -- and as I
20 say, I don't remember, the instruction one way or another
21 came to me or someone in my shop sent it.

22 Mr. Broe went off to a meeting downtown. And he went
23 somewhere else. And rather than say, hold this until I got back
24 at five o'clock, off it goes.

25 Mr. Schwarz. The next thing that puzzled me -- and

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

123

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 you can help cast some light upon it -- it goes on to say:

2 "Bennett and Philpott are aware of his valuable
3 efforts," and so forth and so on.

4 And then: "This new message originates outside the
5 office of Bennett and Philpott, and is known to several persons"

6 Now, by the new message I take it you would agree
7 that that is referring to the message that went out in
8 Exhibit 5 on that same day?

9 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Which, incidentally, I see went out, if
11 you will look at Exhibit 5, at the same time to the minute,
12 is that right?

13 Mr. Phillips. Will you please repeat it?

14 Mr. Schwarz. Did both exhibits 5 and 7 go out at 1420
15 22 October 70? /

16 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

17 Mr. Schwarz. They went out at the same time?

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes. That doesn't necessarily mean that they
19 were written at precisely the same time.

20 The Chairman. What does it mean, then?

21 Mr. Phillips. That figure is the office of Communications
22 figures, Senator. They put that on when the message actually
23 goes.

24 The Chairman. When it actually goes?

25 Mr. Phillips. That is right. So, if you wrote a routine

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

124

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 cable it might be there at five o'clock on Thursday afternoon
2 and not go until Friday afternoon because there are others.

3 So, it means that that came down there, the two were together,
4 or came some time together and were certainly sent together.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Now, getting back do Exhibit 7 and the sen-
6 tence which reads, "This new message originates outside the
7 Office of Bennett and Philpott and is known to several persons,"
8 do you agree with me that "new message" refers to Exhibit 5?

9 Mr. Phillips. I do.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And we have already established or you ::
11 have testified that Exhibit 5 was based upon your simply putting
12 a heading on Exhibit 6, which is the document purporting to be
13 from Bennett to Wimert and signed by Philpott?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, if Exhibit 5 was based upon something
16 signed by Philpott purporting to be from Bennett, why in
17 Exhibit 7 did you say this new message originates outside the
18 office of Bennett and Philpott.

19 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. Despite the fact that I
20 released this cable, I don't recall that I wrote this cable,
21 for instance.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Let me put to you the problem. General
23 Bennett says, I never authorized any such cable. The Defense
24 Department has searched the Defense Department records and
25 can find no such authority. The messages we have agreed were

~~TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ 125

1 puzzling or strange, or whatever characterization you want
2 to give. You can't explain that sentence?

3 Mr. Phillips. I cannot. And I don't know to whom they
4 refer when this message said, it is known to several persons,
5 I don't know who those persons are.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any basis, based upon what
7 you know, upon which you could disagree with General Bennett's
8 statements that he never authorized use of his name, and never
9 was briefed on this.

10 Mr. Phillips. I cannot say that what he is saying is
11 not correct, because I didn't meet him, and I didn't parti-
12 cipate and I didn't really pay much attention to these outside
13 things.

14 So, I can't say that he is wrong when he says that.

15 Mr. Schwarz. You can't comment, then, one way or the
16 other?

17 Mr. Phillips. I don't feel that I can.

18 Senator Schweiker. In an overseas operation now, Mr.
19 Phillips -- I am generalizing, I am getting away from this
20 immediate problem -- how much coordination in a typical opera-
21 tion is there normally, say, between DIA and CIA and overseas
22 operation? Is this normal procedure, abnormal procedure,
23 or what kind of a relationship exists in projects overseas
24 between DIA and CIA?

25 Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is a very broad spectrum. In the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED¹²⁶

1 business of intelligence dissemination there is great coordina-
2 tion. All of our messages or nearly all, go to the
3 Defense Department, and vice versa, and so forth. In actual
4 operations it is the exception to the rule. Where the CIA
5 would go to the DIA and say, we are running such and such a type
6 operation, and we want you to know about it, you would go if
7 you needed their help. That sort of thing.

8 Senator Schweiker. But in the covert field you would
9 generally stay in your own channel unless you specifically
10 needed them for something?

11 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

12 And the coordination is more than likely to be up the
13 line through the political counsellor to the Ambassador's
14 office than necessarily with the military or with the USIA
15 or something like that.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing along with the language of Ex-
17 hibit 7, you went on to say, "As we understand it, Bennett
18 and Philpott felt they could not tell these new interested
19 parties of 28 September message. Thus this new instruction
20 is proforma".

21 First, what do you mean by proforma?

22 Mr. Phillips. To put it on the record, and as I
23 said before, I cannot recall the reasons for this, and I am
24 not aware of it, but it seems to me that someone put themselves
25 in the position of talking with whoever these other people were

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

127

1 and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use
2 ██████████ down there, he is really important to us, and
3 that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed
4 by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the
5 only explanation I can give.

6 Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new
7 interested parties and the several persons referred to in
8 the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority
9 than Bennett and Philpott?

10 Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just --
11 this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem
12 logical to me that they would start going outside and down,
13 I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I
14 only assume that.

15 Mr. Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself
16 being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as
17 you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

18 Mr. Phillips. I understand.

19 Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using ██████████ and knew
20 some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which
21 would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but
24 very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an in-
25 terest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

128

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

WORD & PAUL

1 of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are
2 embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing
3 the work for the CIA [REDACTED]

4 Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety
5 daily events, were they?

6 Mr. Phillips. They were not.

7 Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

8 Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it
9 was necessarily because General Philpott would have been
10 embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

11 But this rather unusual step was made because of the
12 talents of the military men, to bring him into a program
13 that you weren't even talking with the State Department about.
14 And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am
15 really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things
16 that I obviously had something to do with.

17 But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job.
18 and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would
19 be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and
20 the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when
21 someone would come in and say, we want something to go down
22 to [REDACTED], and it has something to do with General Philpott.
23 I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had
24 been one of our operations.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

129

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD B. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse
2 [REDACTED] Background for his information".

3 Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his
4 information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine
5 background.

6 The other is that it is a story to be given [REDACTED] for
7 his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way
8 do you read it if you do not know what the facts are?

9 Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because
10 nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do
11 I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent
12 of falsehood in putting something down like that.

13 So, I assume that it is really for his background of
14 what happened.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got
16 the information which you provided in this cable?

17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful
18 after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

19 Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation
20 "that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when [REDACTED] shown"
21 the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

22 Did you advise General Bennett?

23 Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I
24 presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been
25 involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED 130

1 Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't
2 know that it was.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply
4 from Wimert is located? Is it K?

5 Mr. Treverton. K, yes.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit
7 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant
8 General Bennett ~~[REDACTED]~~.

9 (The document referred to was
10 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8
11 for identification.)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD A. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

UNCLASSIFIED
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

131

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we
2 correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA
3 station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come
4 from [REDACTED] and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant
5 General Bennett?

6 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

7 Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would
8 such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the
9 responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

10 Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable
11 would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an
12 info copy and this, that and the other.

13 The action on this cable would have certainly have gone
14 at least to Mr. Broe, and possibly higher, because it says,
15 this is his message to the head of another government
16 service. And so it would have gone to that level.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have
18 come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to
19 either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

20 Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a
21 cable will come in and there will be more than one copy.
22 And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and
23 then you get the information copy, and so forth.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable
25 whether there would have been more than one copy?

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

132

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went
2 to.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Does the "eyes only" have any significance
4 to you in the third line?

5 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what [redacted]

6 [redacted] was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Department,
7 but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else
8 other than General Bennett.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

10 Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

12 Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been
13 highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying,
14 give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to
15 be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

16 Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its
17 delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

18 Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded
19 into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is
20 really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes
21 through a communications channel, it means that they are going
22 to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If
23 an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive
24 message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying,
25 will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

133

1 I would doubt that this went to the Defense Department
2 electronically. I would imagine that someone might have gotten
3 on one of the very secure phones and spoken only to him, the
4 gray line or the green line. But I would imagine that someone
5 would have put this in an envelope and hand carried it.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Now, assuming that that assumption of yours
7 based on the ordinary course was in fact what was done here,
8 would in the ordinary course the Agency have kept some record
9 which would indicate the time or the method or the time and the
10 method by which the message was passed to Lieutenant General
11 Bennett?

12 Mr. Phillips. They should have if they did not.

13 Mr. Schwarz. And that would be the ordinary fact?

14 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Inderfurth, after this was received
16 from the Central Intelligence Agency do we have a document
17 indicating on its face that this message was passed to General
18 Bennett?

19 Mr. Quanbeck. We have received no such information from
20 the CIA.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Would you telephone the Central Intelligence
22 Agency and ask them if there is any such record. And
23 we have asked them, and they have purported to give us all
24 documents relating to this matter. But let's ask the specific
25 questions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

134

1 Mr. Phillips. If you had called on one of the secure
2 phones there -- someone wouldn't have necessarily wrote down
3 that I called on the secure phone today. Generally speaking
4 one would, but not necessarily. If it were electronic there
5 is usually all some kind of business, and I don't want to
6 imply that I think there is some very formal setup for these
7 very unusual messages. I don't think there is such a formal
8 setup. But I would assume that someone would jot down some-
9 where, delivered the message to General Bennett.

10 So, I don't want to create the impression that there is
11 an automatic way that this would go in the way a regular
12 message would.

13 Mr. Schwarz. But it is your testimony that in the
14 ordinary course some record would be kept in the Agency of the
15 fact of passing of the message on to General Bennett?

16 Mr. Phillips. In nearly all cases -- I would like to
17 amend that testimony to say that I might make the judgment
18 that something that is so terribly, terribly sensitive,
19 they would just keep completely informal. That would be a
20 personal judgment.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Would you read that message as being of
22 that character?

23 Mr. Phillips. Oh, yes. It is a very, very sensitive
24 one.

25 Mr. Schwarz. But it isn't any more sensitive than a

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

135

1 of the other documents we have been looking at, is it?
2

3 Mr. Phillips. No. But the other documents were back
4 and forth between the CIA station. This is one that is going
5 outside.

6 Mr. Schwarz. I see.
7

8 But wouldn't that be a reason, Mr. Phillips, to be par-
9 ticularly careful to know the method by which the document
10 was passed?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes. Most people would do that.
12

13 Mr. Schwarz. That is an argument in favor of recording
14 its passage, isn't it?
15

16 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
17

18 What I am saying is that it would be customary to make
19 some sort of business, but not necessarily obligatory for the
20 person to do it under such unusual circumstances.
21

22 Mr. Schwarz. But the more sensitive the document the
23 more proper it would be to record the fact that it had been
24 handled as requested?
25

Mr. Phillips. I think that is a valid assumption.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you, therefore, make the assumption
that if there is no such record that it would appear that the
message was never passed?

Mr. Phillips. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next Exhibit, Exhibit
9, a cable dated 21 October 1970 from Broe releasing officer,

UNCLASSIFIED

136

1 Phillips authenticating officer, to the Chief of Station
2 Santiago.

3 Have I described it accurately?

4 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

5 Mr. Schwarz. It is at Tab N.

6 (The document referred to was
7 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 9
8 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

25

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

137

No DOD objection to P.L. 11-523, 11-524
pursuant to P.L. 11-523, 11-524
TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Schwarz. This message states:
2 "Please deliver the following message, ('destroy imme-
3 diately') [REDACTED] eyes only from Lieutenant General
4 Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspen-
5 sion temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".
6 What are MAP and FMS.
7 Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or
8 another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.
9 Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?
10 Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.
11 Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?
12 Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.
13 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not,
14 repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the
15 contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which
16 we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and
17 situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date
18 of situation".
19 Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?
20 Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.
21 Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?
22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
23 Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency
24 responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?
25 Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

138

1 Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to
2 do with that, do they?

3 Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that
4 it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett
5 [REDACTED] to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the
6 whole business, all of these different options were being
7 looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with
8 military things because it looks like Allende is going to get
9 in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead
10 and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for
11 [REDACTED] to give him some rationale behind it when he
12 was down there running away trying to foment the coup,
13 saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this govern-
14 ment?

15 I am speculating. But this was another one of those
16 messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?

18 Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

19 Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

20 Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are
21 a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that
22 I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved,
23 and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me
24 or how it arrived.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be
another document which contains the purported message from

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

139

1 General Bennett?

2 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. Not necessarily in this
3 case, I think, because it is not of terrible import. It is
4 the kind of thing -- that is the kind of thing where I can
5 really see someone on the phone saying, hey, would you get a
6 message down there, and you just explain to the fellow why
7 we are doing this thing. And since it is not a terribly unusual
8 message or anything, I can see that no one has made another
9 document of it.

10 Mr. Schwarz. The record should show that the last re-
11 maining Senator has gone.

12 I suppose in this situation we ought to wait.

13 (Off the record.)

14 Senator Schweiker. (now presiding). On the record.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Fenn, perhaps you could recount the
16 telephone conversation that you had with the CIA.

17 Mr. Fenn. I just spoke with Seymour Bolten of the
18 Agency. And he stated to me that there was no record of the
19 October 14 message from Santiago to General Bennett being actu-
20 ally sent over to General Bennett, but he did say that sometimes
21 it was transferred by the telephone, and in that case there
22 might not be a record. He is also checking on who the authors
23 of those 14 October cables are.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And he understands that we are asking for
25 the original of all these documents?

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~¹⁴⁰

1 Mr. Fenn. Yes.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally,
3 was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago
4 which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

5 Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is
6 a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on
7 the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those
8 absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it
9 down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

10 In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I re-
11 alize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is
12 a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General
13 Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of
14 endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that
15 the approach we are making to this?

16 Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach.
17 He has denied any knowledge of this.

18 Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

19 Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

20 Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

21 Mr. Phillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters
22 saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his
23 knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand
24 why. Because the messages went from Philpott [REDACTED]
25 And [REDACTED] said, I am with you 100 percent, and from

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

141

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't
2 recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy
3 on his part about doing what he was doing.

4 And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's
5 side, not having been involved with him.

6 From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that some-
7 one is using that business that I referred to in dispatches,
8 General Bennett says, when they are really talking about
9 what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure
10 he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that
11 is conceivable.

12 But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of
13 little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

14 Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see
15 a motive?

16 Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

17 I can't see the motive for fooling [REDACTED] be-
18 cause [REDACTED] had already started working when he re-
19 ceived the instructions from the number two man in his Agency,
20 which is indeed pretty high up.

21 So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful
22 is that I, too, am confused.

23 Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that
24 Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October
25 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

142

1 much to the sum of knowledge.

2 Mr. Phillips. The fact that I was the author of the
3 cable, especially in this kind of situation, does not mean
4 that I sat down and came up with that process. It meant
5 that I was there, I sent it out, and it might very well have
6 been a situation of someone handing me an informal piece of
7 paper, calling me on the phone, and calling me into the office,
8 and then it would have been natural for me to describe myself
9 as the originator of the cable, because I actually did hand it
10 to the Secretary, and so forth.

11 I mean, you don't put up there, I am writing this cable
12 because I just got a call from Tom Karamessines saying, send a
13 cable to tell them the following. You would appear as the
14 originator no matter where the instructions came from.

15 Senator Schweiker. I am speculating now, Mr. Phillips,
16 and I don't know too much about the picture, so I may not even
17 be speculating intelligently.

18 Could there conceivably be a situation where General
19 Philpott in the early stages okayed something, and then upon
20 checking later with his superior, found out that the superior
21 didn't agree with him, but then just let things go along
22 as they were, would that explain this, or wouldn't that make
23 sense?

24 Mr. Phillips. It is conceivable, but that is as
25 far as I can go. Within CIA I can't --

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

143

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.
2 Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --
3 Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday.
4 We have talked to him. He accepts at least one message. There
5 are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not
6 sure if he accepted two.
7 Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?
8 Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.
9 Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.
10 Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?
11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
12 The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while,
13 as we said previously, things had fallen into place according
14 to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction
15 that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very,
16 very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being
17 that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the
18 inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.
19 And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few
20 of us, probably myself and [REDACTED] and Mr. Broe and Mr.
21 Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but
22 I do remember that meeting going up there and saying, if there
23 ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to
24 say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that
25 meeting.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

144

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Now, mine was only one voice, and I stated that, but I
2 don't think there was anyone that thought differently.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Although Mr. Helms memo for Mr. Kissinger
4 -- whatever it says, there is no point in debating. The
5 actual persons who did the attempted kidnapping and killed
6 General Schneider, do you know who hired them?

7 Mr. Phillips. I do not. And to the best of my recollec-
8 tion, CIA was never in touch with any of them. They were young
9 people, students or something like that. And to the best of
10 my recollection, there was no contact, none of them had worked
11 for us, and none of them were contract agents, and that sort
12 of thing.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Was it the same group of people?

14 Mr. Phillips. Brand new names.

15 Mr. Schwarz. The group that General Viaux in his plan
16 and General Valenzuela in his plan, both of whom were looking
17 toward a kidnapping, were intending to use?

18 Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. As a matter of
19 fact, to my recollection, I don't think that General Viaux or
20 General Valenzuela ever said, look, we have got a plan, and
21 here are the lists of people that are going to help us. It was
22 on a much higher level. The plan is going to work because
23 we can get weapons out of the arsenal and we know the key
24 man in the Carabineros. But I am not aware that we were ever
25 told of who the soldiers were.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

145

1 Mr. Schwarz. One final question.

2 Do you recall being informed that the persons who were
3 arrested for having accomplished the kidnapping had in their
4 possession gas masks which were not of the type issued to
5 the Chilean army.

6 Mr. Phillips. I have heard conflicting stories about
7 those gas masks. I don't know which ones were accurate.
8 Remember that I went back to Rio de Janeiro on the 31st
9 of October. So, a lot of this followup thing then occurred
10 while I was overseas for several years, and so forth.

11 But I have heard conflicting stories. One story I heard
12 was that they were the kind of gas masks that we passed, and
13 another story I heard was that they were not the kind. And I
14 don't have any accurate information on it. The one thing I
15 do recall is that the Chilean press came out with the story
16 of their investigation and said that General Schneider had
17 been killed by small arms fire.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And you make that point, that he was not
19 killed by that machine gun?

20 Mr. Phillips. Yes. Because obviously I would hope that
21 the findings of this group are that the unfortunate death
22 of General Schneider was not the result of a CIA assassination
23 plan, because I am convinced that it was not. And that is
24 obviously my feeling.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Miss Culbreth, I am finished.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

146

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 The Chairman. Miss Culbreth.
2 Miss Culbreth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
3 Mr. Phillips, in your prior testimony today you have
4 discussed your concern as a professional as to the
5 efficacy of this Track II plan which you were called in to
6 operate.
7 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
8 Miss Culbreth. But do I also understand that at all
9 times you were aware that there was also this Track I proposal
10 which was being carried forward?
11 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I was certainly aware of that. I
12 didn't really participate in it, I knew it was going on there,
13 and there were people that were outside of the office that
14 I was working on, and so forth.
15 Miss Culbreth. But that program was going on?
16 Mr. Phillips. Yes.
17 Miss Culbreth. And your efforts toward effecting a coup
18 or toward effecting in some way the removal from office or
19 preventing Allende from reaching office was within the context
20 of the knowledge that this other track was taking place?
21 Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is true. It was also within the
22 context of the knowledge that it didn't seem to be very effect-
23 ive, but that it was taking place.
24 Miss Culbreth. The attitude that you expressed toward
25 an instruction for assassination, you stated that if anybody

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

147

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 had told you as an officer of the CIA to do such a thing, that
2 you would have resigned?

3 Mr. Phillips. I would have, one reason being that I pro-
4 mised my wife that for a number of years.

5 Miss Culbreth. And that is your personal attitude?

6 Mr. Phillips. It is.

7 Miss Culbreth. You are not saying that is necessarily
8 reflective of the attitude of every one who might have found
9 himself in a similar situation?

10 Mr. Phillips. I am convinced that it reflects the
11 attitude of the great majority of the people that work there.
12 And I would put that at something like 96 percent.

13 Miss Culbreth. As good as the ratio in which you said
14 that this plan couldn't succeed?

15 Mr. Phillips. Perhaps something like that.

16 Senator Schweiker. How many percent did you say?

17 Mr. Phillips. I am convinced that 96 percent of my
18 friends --

19 Senator Schweiker. How do you arrive at 96 percent?

20 Mr. Phillips. I am just trying to make a point and be
21 emphatic.

22 Senator Schweiker. Did you take a poll?

23 Mr. Phillips. No.

24 Senator Schweiker. We are interested in polls here on the
25 Hill. I was just curious how you got the 96 percent.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

148

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. To the extent that I am aware of any
2 investigations that this Committee may be having about assass-
3 ination plans as opposed to involvement, as opposed to the
4 Dominican thing, a great many of the people that work in CIA
5 on a thing like the Dominican thing say, we are going to
6 undertake a project, and they are aware that it might lead
7 to serious consequences, and that sort of thing.

8 And the vast majority of them considering themselves
9 professionals go along with that. My point is that I believe
10 that 96 to 98 percent, close to 99 percent of the people that
11 I have worked with, if someone sat down and said, it looks like
12 the only way that we are going to solve this problem is to
13 send someone in and shoot this man in the back of the head,
14 I believe they would have the same reaction. Not all of them
15 would resign, you know. You get to the point where you are a
16 bureaucrat and have got three kids and one of them starting
17 in college, and it is not easy. But I am absolutely convinced
18 of that. I do know on the basis of my recent knowledge that
19 people within the CIA were absolutely shocked by learning some
20 of the things that we learned recently.

21 Now, I don't know to what extent your Committee has
22 knowledge of other such things, but I really am absolutely
23 convinced that as a whole, and a large part of the whole, it
24 is alien to the thoughts of the people that worked at the
25 CIA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

149

1 Miss Culbreth. Thank you, Mr. Phillips.

2 You stated that there was no consideration prior to
3 General Schneider's death of an assassination as such, that
4 this topic just didn't come up?

5 Mr. Phillips. It didn't come up, it wasn't proposed
6 as an option, no one sat down and wrote a memo and said, I be-
7 lieve we have got to do it, or came back and said, look, we
8 have been given the word to go all out, and that includes
9 assassination, or whatever you can do, and so forth. It was
10 a very broad mandate, and included just about everything else.

11 But in this instance, for this period, there was not a
12 single time when anyone said, well, if they really want it that
13 bad, maybe we can just knock off again. I never heard that talk.

14 Miss Culbreth. And that was different from the
15 situation that had existed with regard to the Dominican
16 Republic in which the U.S. had received information that
17 included in the plan for the deposition or the disposition
18 all of Trujillo were specific assassination plans, is that
19 not correct?

20 Mr. Phillips. Yes, from my experience I would say that
21 those always include everything but the kitchen sink, they
22 throw in everything they can. And I can certainly see that in
23 the case of Trujillo, anyone that knows Latin America and knows
24 what happened on that island for 31 years, under Trujillo
25 would be more likely to say, well, if that turns out to be

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

150

1 what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside
2 of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool,
3 and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies
4 to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in
5 refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days
6 to die.

7 Miss Culbreth. You had served [REDACTED] in
8 the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in
9 this position on the Track II party?

10 Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of
11 Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much
12 aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement.
13 U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our
14 arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while
15 those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly
16 nation", relations were very bad.

17 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General
18 Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by
19 your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

20 Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do
21 that now.

22 Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize
23 his death as having been an assassination?

24 Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that
25 occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

151

1 when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing
2 around his car he drew his gun.

3 Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

4 I would like to direct your attention to this cable
5 that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated
6 September 27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in
7 talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A
8 false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by
9 10 October".

10 And you were questioned about this part: "These
11 officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap
12 potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any
13 Chilean. An example: We have a [REDACTED] who can pose as
14 [REDACTED] intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and
15 ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a [REDACTED].

16 In the second paragraph which was not read earlier,
17 I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

18 "Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by
19 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate
20 and recruit under false colors, will give station great
21 flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations
22 securely".

23 To me this second paragraph indicates that these false
24 flag officers were people that had experience in this very
25 kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

152

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

17 K-13
(1)(A)

WARD & PAUL

1 Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me personally and had worked for me.

3 Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity
4 as a false flag officer?

5 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

6 Miss Culbreth. So, this was not some unique and unusual,
7 devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this
8 instance?

9 Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, es-
10 pecially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the imme-
11 diate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first
12 heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on,
13 that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what
14 are you talking about, this, that and the other.

15 As a matter of fact, as I recall, [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] was terribly upset, because he is a sort of
17 an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words,
18 to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing
19 came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the
20 station that we had been given this job to do and that we
21 at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to
22 accomplish the job that they had been given with the least
23 possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that
24 sort of thing.

25 Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

153

1 it was this morning, as I recall, that this was not an
2 unusual technique, not assassination now, but the false flag
3 officer technique.

4 Do I recollect correctly?

5 Mr. Phillips. Yes. It couldn't be characterized as
6 rare. It is unusual, but it is not rare. I mean it is something
7 that is always a possibility, if you are thinking -- it is
8 vital to us that we know what is going on inside this Cuban
9 embassy in such and such a country. Cubans are not easy
10 people to recruit for intelligence purposes. And so it is not
11 out of the question, in fact it is very probably, that one of
12 the possibilities that you would think of is, let's send in
13 someone that says he is a North Korean, and say, look, I know
14 that our countries really get along pretty well, but Cuba is
15 trying to pull off a great big deal and we want to know about
16 it, can you help us?

17 In other words, deceive a person into thinking that
18 he is working for someone more or less of his own political
19 ideas, or from a country that he doesn't have an automatic
20 reaction from. An American goes up to a Cuban diplomat that
21 he wants to recruit, and immediately the Cuban diplomat says,
22 don't talk to me, you are an American. But you send in an
23 American that pretends to be an Argentine, but is really
24 an American, they can meet, go to dinner, play tennis together,
25 and ultimately, posing as an Argentine, that CIA American

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

154

1 officer could make some offer, how would you like to have
2 an extra few hundred bucks to help me make some money in
3 the market, or something.

4 So, that is my point. It doesn't happen all the time,
5 but it is not really an absolute rare thing. But I did say
6 this morning it is not unusual that it should be used in
7 this operational sense so much.

8 Miss Culbreth. I would like to ask you a little further
9 about another document that we discussed this morning. In the
10 document that appears under Tab 4 in the book, which was the
11 chronology, and on page 8 you were asked about a couple of cables
12 that appeared there.

13 The first one was dated October 23. And the second one was
14 dated October 28. The one of October 28 in particular says:

15 "It now appears that the military principals with whom
16 we are in contact depend on the abduction of General Schneider
17 probably by General Viaux, as the pretext needed to launch a
18 coup".

19 And since that came after General Schneider's death, the
20 key seemed to be whether or not that was really the way you
21 remembered it, because you had said that after his death
22 we thought, well, that is it, there can't be anything further.
23 I have here a document which has a somewhat fuller summary of
24 that information from October 28 which refers to recent
25 development in Tab 2, and I would like to read you the full

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

155

1 context out of which that sentence came and then ask you a
2 question about it. And I believe you all have this, it is
3 from the log of the CIA on October 28. It says:

4 "Following attack on Schneider there had been few
5 developments on Track II." And now the sentence that we
6 heard before: "It now appears that the military principals
7 with whom we were in contact depended on the abduction
8 of General Schneider, probably by General Viaux, as the pre-
9 text needed to launch a coup. This was a serious plan, but
10 the unexpected resistance of Schneider and his subsequent
11 death inhibited further action. Presumably the military figures
12 were not willing to be a part of violence beyond the kidnapping
13 scheme".

14 And my question to you is, does this fuller statement
15 of the cable from October 28 more accurately reflect what you
16 remember about the reaction that you and the CIA had when
17 General Schneider was killed.

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think it does. And I believe that
19 this morning I did indicate that to some degree. Yes, it
20 does.

21 The point that I was trying to make, I think, was that
22 it was only after the fact that we realized that the
23 Valenzuela group, that it appeared that maybe part of their
24 master plan was to use General Viaux, which I don't think we
25 knew when we were dealing with him before, we knew they were

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

156

1 in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even
2 though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

3 Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind
4 as principal operating officer here in the states that there
5 was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the
6 Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them
7 as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really
8 regard them as separate groups?

9 Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two
10 separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America
11 some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else.
12 But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups,
13 and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I
14 thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought
15 that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

16 And then we had the other group which seemed to be
17 more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I
18 very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

19 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that
20 might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping opera-
21 tions when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up
22 on these.

23 With regard to the information that was given to you,
24 the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the
25 Chief of Station and were directed to [REDACTED] who can

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

157

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 we talk to if you don't recall that would be able to
2 assist us in knowing just where that information and where
3 that line of instruction came from? Is there anyone besides
4 Mr. Broe and Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms?

5 Mr. Phillips. Those were the two names I was going to
6 give you.

7 Miss Culbreth. Is there anyone else that might be able
8 to assist us that might be able to recall something because he
9 was present in that operation what you haven't been able to
10 recall?

11 Mr. Phillips. Under ordinary circumstances there would
12 have been a man in the Agency whose daily business it is to con-
13 duct liaison with the CIA. And that would have been the
14 answer under ordinary circumstances. But in this case I am
15 almost positive that that man was not cut in on this operation,
16 and knew of it.

17 Consequently, I would think that the conversations with
18 the General would have been Mr. Broe probably at a minimum,
19 and Mr. Karamessines more likely, but those are the two
20 persons who should know best.

21 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall what that man's name
22 is, the DIA liaison?

23 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I do not.

24 Miss Culbreth. With regard to the long memorandum of
25 December 2, 1970, from Director Helms to Henry Kissinger, have

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

158

1 you had an opportunity since that was first put before you
2 this morning to look at that more than just briefly?

3 Mr. Phillips. No, I have not. But my general impression
4 was, scanning it, that it is a pretty accurate, carefully
5 recent summary.

6 Miss Culbreth. That is what I wanted to ask you,
7 if you noticed anything that appeared incorrect or unusual
8 to you, or was a surprise?

9 Mr. Phillips. No, nothing jumped out of there that was
10 a surprise.

11 Miss Culbreth. That is all.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

YR
d dash
fois
WARD
W
JUL

MARY FARRELL
FOUNDATION
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

159

1 Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

2 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How
3 large was the room you were operating out of? You described
4 it as a small windowless room.

5 Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there --
6 no, not that big.

7 Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the
8 Task Force?

9 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

10 Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force
11 besides you?

12 Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries,
13 there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing.
14 There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. [REDACTED]
15 six, eight, something like that.

16 Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

18 Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

19 Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much [REDACTED] and myself,
20 [REDACTED] the real action officers. And then there were two junior
21 officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given
22 Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And
23 there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence
24 ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five
25 officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

160

1 could be indebted as a kind of manager of the paper, and
2 since this was so closely held, the regular support people
3 didn't have the files, and he was the one that saw to it. So
4 there were six or eight. And then there were some secretaries
5 that took the shifts.

6 Mr. Johnston. That is all.

7 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Lombard.

8 Mr. Lombard. Mr. Phillips, would you describe to me how
9 General Snyder died briefly?

10 Mr. Phillips. As I understand it -- and you will have to
11 understand, sir, that there wasn't an eye witness agent's
12 report or anything like that -- as I understand it, he was in
13 his car, a number of young people in two or three other cars
14 stopped him while he was driving, surrounded his car, the
15 windows were up, --I don't remember that -- they surrounded
16 his car, and he immediately reached, when he saw them he
17 immediately reached for a gun, to pull a gun, so they started
18 shooting. That is the way I understand it. But that is a
19 second-hand report.

20 Mr. Lombard. Was it the intent of the group to kill
21 General Snyder or abduct him?

22 Mr. Phillips. It was my belief that the intent was to
23 abduct him.

24 Mr. Lombard. And if that is true, the death of General
25 Snyder occurred during the attempt to abduct him?

~~TOP SECRET UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

161

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

3

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no quedstion in my mind about that.

2 Mr. Lombard. Then could his death be characterized as an
3 assassination?
5

4 Mr. Phillips. It could not. And I ceratinly hope that it
5 will not be. Because it was involvement in a man's death. But
6 it is very definitely not assassination. It is unfortunate,
7 and so forth. But if that sticks, then I assassinated those
8 people in Europe when I dropped bombs.
8

9 Mr. Lombard. One last question. Could you provide the
10 Committee with your understanding of what a definition of an
11 assassination would be?
11

12 Mr. Phillips. An assassination is the death of a man after
13 a premeditated decision that that death was necessary to change
14 things the way you wanted to change them.
14

15 Mr. Lombard. Would there be one more element, that it
16 would have to be someone prominent in the political life of a
17 government in the context in which we are using it?
17

18 Mr. Phillips. I think it is generally accepted that you
19 are talking about political figures when you talk about an
20 assassination.
20

21 Mr. Lombard. So the two necessary ingredients here would
22 be premeditation and a political motive?
22

23 Mr. Phillips. That is true.
23

24 Mr. Lombard. Thank you.
24

25 Mr. Phillips. And if there is one thing that I feel I can
25

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED 162

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD A. PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

state categorically unequivocally, it was that the death of General Snyder was not the result of assassination planning, and I think it would be unfair to characterize it as that.

Senator Schweiker. Mr. Phillips, just fill me in on the next chapter. I realize that we are not focusing on that. But I think it is interesting what subsequently happened. Just very briefly, obviously Allende took power. And then I wonder if you could just briefly describe, since you are intimately acquainted with the country, the next coup and what happened there with Allende's death, so that I might be filled in on that?

Mr. Phillips. Since you have asked me that, Senator, I think to some degree it is an extension of some remarks that I made earlier this morning, that I was concerned in 1970, I stayed within the system, and then found myself in 1973 in charge of the Chilean operations, because I was the Chief of Latin American Affairs.

During the Coup in which President Allende died the US Government and the CIA did not fund the strikers that led up to that coup. And they did not encourage the plotters who overthrew him. It was not a question of making policy, but there was an in-house decision, there was no longer pressure from outside or above about Allende. And the CIA station there was made to understand that it began to really look like there was going to be a coup, and to keep their skirts clean.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

163

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 There have been press reports about the fact that we
2 supported those strikers, and they are inaccurate. Allende
3 fell because the economy went to hell in a hand basket. Two
4 out of three mills in Chile had no flour to grind. The rate
5 of inflation in the last year before his death was 183 percent.
6 He was receiving opposition from purely Chilean elements,
7 copper miners, truck drivers, and people like that.
8

9 I also recall that when he won the election
10 he didn't win with an overwhelming majority. When he went into
11 office there were a number of people in the country who were
12 already opposed to him. When Fidel Castro came and assisted
13 him, when the intelligence service was taken over by new
14 elements -- and it was the Cubans who were helping them with
15 their intelligence work -- there were a number of reasons that
16 people that were concerned about Marxism were upset. But the
17 real reason was the economy. Fidel Castro was right. The only
18 way that Allende was going to put that one off was to be tough
19 for a long time. And I am absolutely convinced, thoroughly
20 convinced, that that is why he fell. And I want to state very
21 clearly for the record, because I played a role in it -- and
22 I personally was involved in the country of Chile, three of
23 my children were born there -- that when Allende died it was
24 because there was a coup against him by Chileans, and not
25 because they were supported or abetted or encouraged or even
winked at by the CIA.

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

1 Senator Schweiker. That is unusual, isn't it?

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes sir, it is unusual. In this case the
3 station was instructed, it really looks like there is going to
4 be one, and it is absolutely inevitable that the CIA and the
5 US Government will be blamed no matter how it occurs, and for
6 that reason you must be more than ever careful to avoid
7 contacts with people that are plotting to overthrow him, or to
8 help -- there were many people who said, these strikes,
9 especially the truckers' strike, they are going to topple him,
10 and boy, if someone will just give them \$500,000, that is the
11 end. And those proposals were not acceptable.

12 Senator Schweiker. The leader of that coup was who?

13 Mr. Phillips. It was a military coup. There were several.
14 General Pinochet was one, and there was an Army man and a Navy
15 man. There were about four that were really involved.

16 Senator Schweiker. Did any of those individuals play any
17 role in the preceding events that we have just described? In
18 other words, they obviously were in the Armed Services, they
19 had some position at that time. Where were they in the '70
20 timeframe?

21 Mr. Phillips. I don't think any of them played any
22 substantial role, no. They weren't players in the sens that we
23 have been talking about in Track 2.

24 Senator Schweiker. And how as Allende killed? Can you
25 describe that?

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

165

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 Mr. Phillips. There are conflicting stories. I don't know.
2 Obviously it is to the advantage of the present Chilean regime
3 to propogate the idea that Allende committed suicide, because
4 at least in the Latin mind that makes him look like a weaker
5 character, there is no question but that it would be to their
6 advantage. I don't think anyone in the US Government can tell
7 you whether he committed suicide or whether he was killed in
8 a fight. He was a brave man, obviously, he was there with a
9 helmet and a gun on up to the last minute.

10 Senator Schweiker. Where was that?

11 Mr. Phillips. That was in the National Palace, in a
12 building called Monede just across from the American Embassy.
13 And he was barricaded in there. And I think it is probably
14 to some degree irrelevant, because he was a brave man, and he
15 died in violence, people were shooting into that building and
16 going into it and so forth, and I think a suicide almost in
17 that instance would not be a suicide. But I don't think any-
18 one knows.

19 Senator Schweiker. In retrospect -- and now I am asking
20 you the advantages of hindsight which you never have in any
21 other operation, none of us do -- in retrospect, if you had
22 your druthers, and youwere making decisions, what should have
23 been the CIA's role, position or the Government position, back
24 at the time of Allende's rise to power, with the advantage of
25 hindsight now?

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Phillips. That one is not hard to answer. My personal
2 position, sir, would have been, confronted by the established
3 fact that the first Marxist had been freely elected, that we had
4 better regroup and figure out new ways to handle such problems.
5 And certainly, without any question during the last part of his
6 regime, the policy and the practice was -- and especially in the
7 time just before the coup, because I was around there -- the
8 best thing for US interests, no matter how inimical Allende
9 and his regime was -- to wait for the elections in 1976 and
10 have the first Marxist elected to office turned out of office
by the voters. Obviously that is the way to do it.

11 What you asked is a difficult question.

12 Senator Schweiker. To some extent that is a question the
13 Committee has to face up to. We have to face up to what is the
14 role of our intelligence community. I think everyone here on
15 the Committee feels that we should have an intelligence
16 community and an effective one. But the debate is as to what
17 role they play. I think the Chilean case is a very classical
18 example of the definition of the problem this Committee faces,
19 and you were on the scene both in '72 and '73 where you had a
20 close view.

21 Mr. Phillips. I have given you my point of view. It is
22 affected by the fact that my own political posture -- I am a
23 well defined liberal, and I think I would be more likely to
24 think that. However, I can understand how more senior people
25 in the US Government, looking at the big picture, and this,

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED¹⁶⁷

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 that and the other, could come to other views, and think that
2 more dramatic measures had to be taken. But certainly it is
3 the problem, obviously.

4 Senator Schweiker. Would the flow of history have been any
5 different -- and I know this is a hard question to answer -- had
6 General Snyder not been killed accidentally?

7 Mr. Phillips. No, I think that it did not affect the flow
8 of history. Allende went into office, he was there for awhile
9 trying to govern. And I don't really see that that was a factor
10 in the way it turned out one way or another.

11 Senator Schweiker. Except for two things. You said
12 earlier, as I recall, that as soon as you heard that General
13 Snyder was killed you said, that is it, in essence the ball
14 game is over in the sense of carrying out a military coup,
15 because from what I knew of Chileans. the Chileans were
16 certainly shocked by it, look what all this hocus pocus has
17 suddenly turned into. Because Chileans, like other Latin
18 Americans Governments, doesn't have the tradition of violence
19 and change in government. The last coup in Chile was 43 years
20 before, and it was a bloodless kind of thing that they woke up
21 to in the morning. And it was way back in 1891 that they had
22 violence. And so it is very different in Chile, just as it is
23 different trying to bribe Chileans -- lots of luck, but you are
24 not going to do it.

25 Senator Schweiker. Senator Hart, we have just about

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~⁶⁸

concluded all our questions. What about you?

1 Senator Hart of Michigan. I have been in and out, and I
2 apologize for it.

3 I came back, though, to raise a question about Cuba. How
4 many years were you in Cuba?

5 Mr. Phillips. I have perhaps the dubious distinction of
6 having served more Cuban time than anyone else in CIA, I
7 suppose. I was stationed on the Island twice, 1955 and 1956,
8 and then again in 1958, 1959, and the early part of 1960. In
9 1968 and 1969 I was in charge of Cuban operations. In Mexico
10 during part of my four years there I was in charge of Cuban
11 operations in Mexico.

12 Senator Hart of Michigan. This morning I understood you to
13 say that you never heard of a program to assassinate Castro
14 while you were in Cuba?

15 Mr. Phillips. I did not, sir.

16 Senator Hart of Michigan. Did I hear you straight?

17 Mr. Phillips. You did, sir. As I see the developments --
18 now assassinate, not topple.

19 Senator Hart of Michigan. That gets us into that delightful
20 discussion that has occurred several times, and an interesting
21 discussion. But I use assassinate in the sense that -- and
22 counsel just defined it, -- premeditation of a particular
23 target, the desire to kill the subject, and the political
24 figure.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

169

1 Mr. Phillips. In addition to those times I mentioned, I
2 failed to mention that I worked in the planning for the Bay
3 of Pigs. During all that time I never heard anyone in the CIA
4 sit down with an assassination plan. There was a long period
5 in which it was obvious that we were expected to try and find
6 a way to topple the Castro regime.

7 Senator Hart Of Michigan. I understand.

8 Mr. Phillips. And the Bay of Pigs was a plan that
9 envisaged the possible death of a great many people. So
10 involvement, that is involvement with a capital I. But I
11 never heard a single time any mention of any of this during
12 those times that I was around. Now, one of the reasons, I now
13 realize, is that in the assassination plans per se, I think it
14 is now obvious that our Office of Security was involved. The
15 things that I am now reading in the paper seem pretty accurate.
16 So the Office of Security was in the unusual business of doing
17 something. And I was in the operations side. And if they ran
18 around to the operations side to tell anyone, there I was
19 working on the operations side, they would certainly tell
20 someone way up the line, they certainly never told me. That is
21 why I realize that such talks could have gone on without my
22 being a participant. But not once have I ever sat in a meeting
23 or gotten together with anyone to plan the assassination of
24 Castro -- a lot of other things.

25 Senator Hart of Michigan. Getting back to the business, you

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

170

1 knew about an effort to topple Castro, and you knew of an effort
2 to kidnap General Snyder -- the Chairman used the expression,
3 accidentally he was killed in connection with the kidnapping.
4 How do you suggest compelling whoever it is responsible in this
5 Government, for decisions that seek to overthrw the Government
6 to face the probability -- or as a likely consequence of that
7 there will occur what would otherwise be described as an
8 assassination? Nobody apparently sits down and decides that
9 they are going to kill John Smith, the President of country A.
10 That apparently is abhorrent. But more than once they sit
11 down and decide they will topple John Smith's government, and
12 accidentally John Smith gets killed, but they feel that is is
13 unfortunate, but apparently no culpability. How could you
14 suggest the ultimate decision makeers be confronted more
15 specifically with the probable consequences?

16 Mr. Phillips. Well, historically, Senator, we have had a
17 situation where two American Presidents have immediately
18 accepted responsibility for something when there was a flap,
19 Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, and Eisenhower with the U-2
20 incident. There have been other incidents where something has
21 happened and there has been no talk. It seems to me that it is
22 simply a question of establishing the rules of the game. In
23 that third part of the Charter where it says, other such
24 functions and duties, such as A, B, C, D, and E, and one of
25 them is that in any political action contemplated there is the

~~TOP SECRET~~~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

171

13

1 reasonable possibility that lives will be lost, the rules are
2 the following. It can be done only if the President insists
3 and the Joint Committee says, yes, we think that in this case
4 the national interest is so at peril that we do take that
5 chance. But implicit in that, Senator, is that that Joint
6 Committee must take responsibility after the fact, as well as
7 before the fact.

8 However, you are asking me to comment on philosophical
9 matters that I really am not sure that I am capable of talking
10 about. But in the old days the idea was, the intelligence
11 services do the dirty work, shut up, and everybody stonewalls
12 it to use the phrase. If it happens in a country, the American
13 Ambassador says, I don't know about it, the American President
14 says, I don't know about it. And there was a term called
15 "plausible denial." That term has now been proscribed at CIA,
16 and you are not supposed to say that anymore. Mr. Colby in
17 all his speeches used to say that, we can't use that term
18 anymore.

19

Senator Schweiker. What term can you use?

20

Mr. Phillips. Well, there is no equivalent to the
21 plausible denial anymore.

22

Senator Schweiker. What has taken its place? That is what
I am trying to find out.

23

Mr. Phillips. What has taken its place is operations that
24 are conducted so securely and so deviously, such as American
25

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY F. REILLY
FOUNDATION
THEATER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

1 that would appear to be a Brazilian if he got caught, that it
2 doesn't come back. But one of the dilemmas in this is that it
3 was only when Khruschev wrote his memos that we realized how u
4 upset he was that Eisenhower admitted the U-2 incident. In his
5 memorirs he said, my God, I was prepared to go on and have
6 that conference, but then Eisenhower stood up and said, yes,
7 we are responsible, and so I had to thump my shoe, or whatever
8 it was, and cancel the conference. And the clear implication
9 that Khruschev was putting across in his book was, why doesn't
10 he be quiet. That is why the satellites that go around the
11 world recently have been quite sensitive, not that the Soviet
12 didn't know about it, or thousands of others didn't know about
13 it, but don't cause loss of face on the other side and we won't
14 cause it on this side.

15 But I think, Senator Hart, that that era has passed in our
16 society. So I think that plausible denial and stonewalling it
17 are past, given the way things are in our country today. And
18 consequently that is why it seems to me that our problem is
19 such a terribly difficult one, because if the American people
20 are going to depend on you for responsible oversight that
21 possibly they felt they haven't had in the past, they are going
22 to depend on you after the fact to justify what you did.

23 Senator Hart of Michigan. I understand your belief to be
24 that it would never be acceptable to plan the assassination of
25 somebody.

UNCLASSIFIED~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

173

1 Mr. Phillips. Absolutely, that is what I believe.

2 Senator Hart of Michigan. What is your view about toppling
3 a government?

4 Mr. Phillips. Senator, I have three views. I have the
5 absolute view that I had in the 1950's, when it seemed that this
6 was a cold war going on, and it was a very serious matter,
7 things were happening in Europe, and the Soviets were really
8 working a great deal around the world. That was one view. The
9 other view that I have is a specific individual one because
10 it involves Latin American in the '60's. Fidel Castrol came
11 into power and he tried to export violent revolution to many
12 countries in Latin America. And after the failure of the Bay
13 of Pigs I believe that Bobby Kennedy thought he wanted to
14 counter this. And he started something that was known as the
15 Counterinsurgency Program. And I think that almost everyone
16 that went abroad, in the US Embassy, the State Department, the
17 USIA, AID, everyone, were supposed to know something about
18 Counterinsurgency, that was the way we were going to handle it.
19 That is the view of the '60's.

20 Senator Schweiker. Was that what Operation Mongoose was
21 all about?

22 Mr. Phillips. No, that was completely separate, this was
23 above board, and everybody went into it that were learning
24 counterinsurgency, and they included civic actions and a lot
25 of good things, valid things.

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

174

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 And the next thing I have is a more recent opinion, the
2 opinion of the seventies, for which I think there is no
3 justification -- I can speak only with authority about Latin
4 America -- I think there is no justification at all for even
5 contemplating it in Latin America. That is the reason that
6 during the last two years we have no covert action, capital C,
7 capital A, in Latin America conducted by the CIA. That is the
8 reason that when I left 23 and a half months ago there wasn't
9 a single penny of CIA money going to student groups, labor
10 groups, politicians, and not a single newspaper was being
11 subsidized. Those were things that were done in the fifties
12 in the Cold War and the sixties of countering Castro in Latin
13 America. But that is the way now in Latin America, because
14 there is no need and no justification.

15 Senator Schweiker. Why isn't there a need, from your
16 definition, now that there was now in the sixties?

17 Mr. Phillips. Obviously you go back and think of the
18 Alliance for Progress and all the work that was tried and
19 didn't work very well. Is there any threat to this country from
20 Latin America? I don't think so.

21 Senator Schweiker. Why was there one in the sixties?

22 Mr. Phillips. There very definitely was. Fidel Castro
23 was providing the training, the arms, the money and even the
24 men. In Venezuela he had 14 officers, Cuban officers, in the
25 hills directing the insurgency movement against a democratic

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

175

17 government which we were trying to support.

1 The same was true in Guatemala in the sixties. What
2 happened? Our American Ambassador was assassinated, two
3 American officers were assassinated. My good friend the
4 German Ambassador von Spreti was kidnapped and killed, and
5 things were going to hell in a hand basket. Che Guevara went
6 to Bolivia and announced he was going to create not one but
7 many Vietnams in Latin America. Castro was supporting Uruguayan
8 guerillas in Uruguay. It was a massive effort to subvert the
9 entire continent. It has stopped now. At that time, yes, we
10 had justification, I believe, for doing that.

11 Senator Hart of Michigan. You had justification for what,
12 a coup or an assassination?

13 Mr. Phillips. No, in this instance, sir, I am talking
14 about assisting those governments to maintain themselves.

15 Senator Hart Of Michigan. But the thing that I have a
16 tough time getting a handle on is, you would still reject an
17 assassination even in the sixties in Latin America?

18 Mr. Phillips. Absolutely.

19 Senator Hart Of Michigan. But you would support a coup
20 which is not more likely to kill many more people than an
21 assassination?

22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

23 Senator Hart of Michigan. What is the judgment of this
24 Committee with respect to a thing like that?

25

~~TOP SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

176

18

1 Mr. Phillips. Senator, you can imagine the thinking
2 that someone in my position would have done. But what I point
3 out to you is that these things were done without exception
4 because a US President wanted them done without exception. And
5 you go to the US and the US President calls you in, and it
6 doesn't matter whether he is a Kennedy or a Nixon or a Johnson
7 or an Eisenhower, and he says, I want you to go down there
8 because I am afraid the Soviets are going to take over
9 Guatemala, and I want you to do something about it.

10 Senator Hart of Michigan. This gets back to my first
11 question. If you went in and told any of those Presidents
12 the way to do it is to assassinate the President, you assumed
13 that any President of ours would say never?

14 Mr. Phillips. I certainly assume that, absolutely, sir.

15 Senator Hart of Michigan. But you assumed also that those
16 Presidents would say yes to a coup?

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

18 Senator Hart of Michigan. My first question is, how can
19 we insure that that President is made to face the probable
20 consequence of a coup, which includes the execution of other
21 country's President, with the same precision that he is
22 confronted when you go to him and say, I want to assassinate
23 that other President?

24 Mr. Phillips. Sir, I am afraid I can't give you any very
25 constructive suggestions on that.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

177

1 Senator Schweiker. Any others, Phil?

2 All right, I guess that brings to a close our session for
3 today. We appreciate it very much. And we will adjourn the
4 meeting.

5 (Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned,
6 subject to the call of the Chair.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

WARD & PAUL

11 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MARY FERRELL
FOUNDATION
IN THE AMERICA

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~